

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

ABHANDLUNGEN ZUR HEGEL-FORSCHUNG

2010

Zusammenstellung und Redaktion: Holger Glinka (Bochum)

Diese fortlaufende Berichterstattung sucht das nicht selbständig erschienene Schrifttum über Hegel, also Abhandlungen aus Zeitschriften, Sammelbänden usw., möglichst breit zu erfassen und durch kurze Inhaltsreferate bekanntzumachen. Sofern Abhandlungen bereits mit Inhaltsreferaten versehen sind, werden diese hier übernommen.

Neu erschienene Bände der *Hegel-Studien-Beihefte* sowie des *Hegel-Jahrbuchs* werden in der Abteilung *Literaturberichte und Kritik* als ganze rezensiert; gleiches gilt für Sammelbände sowie Periodika-Sondernummern, die ausschließlich der Philosophie Hegels gewidmet sind. In der *Bibliographie* werden die einzelnen Abhandlungen solcher Bände nicht mehr angezeigt.

Die Beiträge werden alphabetisch nach dem Namen der Autoren angeordnet. Nicht alle vorgesehenen Inhaltsreferate konnten bis Redaktionsschluß fertiggestellt werden. Sie werden im nächsten Band nachgeholt.

Für diesen Band haben Berichte verfaßt oder bearbeitet: Alfredo Bergés (Barcelona), Giovanni Bonacina (Urbino), Óscar Cubo Ugarte (Buenos Aires, ARG), Gilbert Gérard (Louvain-la-Neuve), Guillaume Lejeune (Brüssel), Elizabeth Millán (New York, US), Fred Rush (Notre Dame, Indiana), Constantine Sandis (Oxford, UK), Allen Speight (Boston), Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer (Leipzig), Jon Stewart (København), Rocío Zambrana (Oregon) und Holger Glinka vom Hegel-Archiv (Bochum).

Die über Hegel arbeitenden Autoren sind freundlich eingeladen, durch Einsendung von Sonderdrucken die Berichterstattung zu erleichtern. Allen, die solche Hilfe bisher schon geleistet haben, sei besonders gedankt.

Aikin, Scott F.: The Problem of the Criterion and Hegel's Model for Epistemic Informatism. — In: *History of philosophy quarterly*. Champaign, IL. 27, 4 (2010), 379–389.

H. has been an inspiration for non-foundationalist epistemology. This essay is an extension of that broadly H.ian tradition. I will argue here that H.'s epistemology, because it is circular and historicist, is a form of epistemic informatism. My core argument is a series of conditionals about H.'s epistemology: 1. If we are to solve the problem of the criterion, the criterion must come from within cognition. 2. If a criterion is from cognition, it must be in terms of cognition's historically situated satisfactions. 3. Cognition is satisfied only if knowledge is complete. 4. Knowledge is complete only if it is systematic. 5. Knowledge is systematic only if it is made explicit by philosophy. 6. If a system is made explicit by philosophy, both the system and the articulation must be circular and ongoing. 7. If philosophy's articulations are circular and ongoing, then they are procedurally infinite. 8. If philosophy is to be procedurally infinite, it must be practiced in a cultural-political climate of an open society with a state protecting freedoms. My main conclusion is that H. has presented a unique form of epistemic informatism, where infinite series of inferences provide justification but the infinite series of inferences are over a finite circular system. My subsidiary conclusion is that H.'s system demonstrates the interdependence of epistemology and politics.

Alexander, Thomas: Comments on James Goody A Search for Unity in Diversity. — In: *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*. Bloomington. 44 (2010), 4, 563–568.

The article comments on author James Goody's ideas in his book *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The Permanent Hegelian Deposit in the Philosophy of John Dewey*. According to the author, Goody's thesis on philosopher John Dewey's relationship with idealism and philosopher H. is complex because Goody understated the central influence of professor William James on Dewey's radical empiricism. Moreover, Goody recognized that Dewey and H. were united in opposing British empiricism, materialism, a historical thinking, or a conception of ethics divorced from a general concern with culture and transformational education.

Alonso Martos, Andres: Hegel y el magnetismo animal en Enz. [Paragraphen] 406 (1830). [Hegel und der animalische Magnetismus in der Enzyklopädie § 406 (1830).] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 167–179.

D'Angelo, Paolo: El cuerpo humano en la estética de Hegel. [Der menschliche Körper in Hegels Ästhetik.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 111–127.

Asseo, Edouard: Theory of consciousness: a “mathematical” reformulation of the Hegel system. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 245–253.

The Theory of Consciousness is essentially a mathematical reformulation of H.s philosophical system. As such it gives a vision of the universe as an all-inclusive whole comprising the objective world that physics addresses and the subjective world. Using mathematics seems to be contradictory with the spirit of the H. system, this is explained and is certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the theory. The main reason for this is that the being is form (with the meaning of matter and form) and a form can be expressed mathematically.

Baiasu, Sorin: Kant’s Account of Motivation: A Sartrean Response to Some Hegelian Objections. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*. London, UK. 61 (2010), 86–106.

Barot, Emmanuel: La dualité de Lautman contre la négativité de Hegel et le paradoxe de leur formalisations. Contribution à une enquête sur les formalisations de la dialectique. — In: *Philosophiques*. Paris. 37 (2010), 1, 111–148.

L’article montre d’abord jusqu’où convergent la dialectique hégélienne de l’Idée et la dialectique lautmanienne des Idées, et ce sur quoi elles se séparent en profondeur: sur la négativité et le statut de la contradiction. Il s’intéresse ensuite à certaines formalisations qui ont été proposées de ces deux dialectiques: celle de Doz et Dubarle (*Logique et dialectique*, 1972) pour H. dans une extension de la logique booléenne, et celle, récemment esquissée par F. Zalamea en théorie des catégories, pour Lautman. Est montré dans ses grandes lignes comment la traductibilité mutuelle, au niveau technique, peut être établie entre les deux entreprises, la conséquence étant que la divergence spéculative semble rétroactivement gommée, que le négatif semble avoir disparu. À partir de ce paradoxe sont présentées quelques pistes de réflexion sur les enjeux de la démarche de formalisation, entendue comme entreprise de réduction du fossé existant entre le conceptuel et le formel, et de ce qu’elle révèle des rapports entre mathématiques et philosophie.

Barrios Casares, Manuel Joaquín: Expresividad e intersubjetividad: apuntes para una crítica hegeliana del yo posmoderno. [Expressivität und Intersubjektivität: Anmerkungen zu einer Hegelianischen Kritik des postmodernen Ich.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 297–306.

Bauer, Christoph J.: La dialéctica de la igualdad: sobre la relación entre antropología y filosofía de la historia en Hegel. [Die Dialektik der Gleichheit: zum Verhältnis von Anthropologie und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 39–64.

Biasetti, Pierfrancesco: Il gradualismo nella psicologia hegeliana e gli stati mentali degli animali: una discussione. [Der Gradualismus in der Hegelianischen Psychologie und die mentalen Zustände der Tiere: eine Diskussion.] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 277–296.

Blachowicz, James: The Incomplete ability of Metaphysics. — In: *Idealistic Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Charlottesville, Va. 40 (2010), 3, 257–273.

If metaphysics identifies transcendental principles with formal principles, the inevitable result will be a reductionist collapse, that is, a theory of the nature of reality that will exclude as inessential significant differences among existing things. To avoid this result, we must take some such material differences (those, for example, that distinguish physical, biological and mental phenomena from one another) as transcendental in nature. This produces a metaphysics in which the concept of ontological emergence is central – a metaphysics that will depend essentially on the material content of the natural sciences. While both Aristotle and H. provided such metaphysics, they did not, I argue, accept one of its most important consequences – that it must be as incomplete as our scientific knowledge of these material differences. I examine this failure and suggest some areas in which contemporary scientific conceptions may contribute to a more contemporary metaphysics.

de Boer, Karin: Hegel's Account of Contradiction in the Science of Logic Reconsidered. — In: *Journal für Geschichte der Philosophie*. Berlin/New York. 48 (2010), 3, 345–374.

This article challenges the prevailing interpretations of H.'s account of the concept “contradiction” in the *Science of Logic* by arguing that it is concerned with the principle of H.'s method rather than with the classical law of non-contradiction. I first consider H.'s *Doctrine of Essence* in view of Kant's discussion of the concepts of reflection in the first *Critique*. On this basis, I examine H.'s account of the logical principles based on the concepts “identity,” “opposition,” and “contradiction.” Finally, I point out how the principle H. derives from the concept of contradiction actually informs his own method.

Bohman, James: Is Hegel a Republican? Pippin, Recognition, and Domination in the Philosophy of Right. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 435–450.

Robert Pippin's masterful account of rational agency in H. emphasizes important dimensions of freedom and independence, where putative independence is always bound up with a profound dependence on others. This insistence on the complex relationships between freedom, dependence and independence raise an important question that Pippin does not consider: is H. a republican? This is especially significant given the fact that modern republicanism has explored this same conceptual terrain. I argue that a form of republicanism is in fact an important aspect of H.'s theory of freedom, and this should lead us to moderate Pippin's account of the conservative side of H.'s conception of social dependence. These affinities mean that even if H. does not fully endorse contemporary versions of republicanism (such as that of Philip Pettit), he shares core features of the republican view of domination and freedom. In fact, H. is a republican to the extent that he shares what Pippin calls ‘that noble nineteenth century idea that my freedom depends upon the freedom of others’. Or, to put it in a more directly republican way typical of the eighteenth century, the freedom of each is dependent upon the freedom of all and thus freedom exists only if it is shared. As developed by Pippin, H.'s conception of shared freedom is inadequate to the extent that it can-

not give a full account of the possibilities of domination and dependence in modern institutions, I illustrate this difficulty through examples taken from H.s *Philosophy of Right*, including marriage, markets, and political deliberation.

Bohrer, Karl-Heinz/Nye, Sean/Felski, Rita: The Tragic: A Question of Art, not Philosophy of History. — In: *New Literary History*. Charlottesville, VA. 41 (2010), 1, 35–51.

The article discusses Greek drama, particularly Aristotle's and H.s philosophy on the nature of tragic. The authors argue that both should not be understood as an aesthetic art, but as a philosophy of history. The plays *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex* by Sophocles are both considered. Aristotle's notion of tragedy in Greek drama is analyzed in a way Charles Baudelaire and Soren Kierkegaard understood tragedy.

Bonacina, Giovanni: Fra hegelismo tradizionalismo e orientalismo. Hinrichs Windischmann e i diari di viaggio di Ulrich Jasper Seetzen. [Zwischen Hegelianismus, Traditionalismus und Orientalismus. Hinrichs Windischmann und die Reisetagebücher von Ulrich Jasper Seetzen.] — In: *Rivista di storia della filosofia*. Milano. 65 (2010), 3, 461–482.

Ein fast vergessener Umstand im Leben des H.ianers H. F. W. Hinrichs ist seine Beteiligung an der Auffindung und geplanten Veröffentlichung der Tagebücher des Orientreisenden J. U. Seetzen (1767–1811), welche von dem Historiker C. F. H. Kruse erst viel später herausgegeben worden sind. Hinrichs, ein Jeveraner wie Seetzen und ein Verwandter desselben, ist in den Besitz einiger Handschriften des gestorbenen Reisenden gekommen durch die Hilfe des Orientalisten und Diplomaten J. v. Hammer, den er während eines Wiener Aufenthalts im Jahr 1825 kennengelernt hat. Drei unveröffentlichte Briefe von Hinrichs an Kruse und an den Oldenburger Bibliothekar L. W. Ch. v. Halem (im Niedersächsischen Landesarchiv, Staatsarchiv Oldenburg, Bestand 170–1, Nr. 186) ergänzen Karl Rosenkranz' kurze Nachricht darüber in seinen Erinnerungen (*Von Magdeburg bis Königsberg*, 1873) und bezeugen Hinrichs' erste Absicht, die Editionsarbeit im Rahmen der neugegründeten Societät für wissenschaftliche Kritik persönlich zu leiten, aber auch seine wachsende Enttäuschung infolge der Entscheidung seiner Korrespondenten, ihn faktisch zu entmachten (Halem und Kruse habe ihn als einen bloßen Philosophen mißachtet und seine Fähigkeit, eine solche Arbeit erfolgreich zu bestreiten, bezweifelt). Das Interessante in Hinrichs' Beschäftigung mit dem Seetzenschen Nachlaß beschränkt sich aber nicht nur auf diese biographische Anekdote. Hinrichs' briefliches Urteil über die ungenügende philosophische Bildung Seetzens, insbesondere über dessen Atheismus und geistige Abhängigkeit von dem Voltaireschen *ecrasez l'infâme!*, deckt sich fast mit den herabsetzenden Bemerkungen über die Religionsphilosophie der deutschen Aufklärung, welche in seiner zeitgleichen Rezension zu K. J. H. Windischmanns *Kritische Betrachtungen über die Schicksale der Philosophie in der neueren Zeit* (vgl. *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, Juni 1827) enthalten sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund versucht Verf. einen Vergleich zwischen der vielseitigen Beurteilung H.s über das Gedankengut des 18. Jahrhunderts, das Hinrichs weitgehend abgelehnt hat, und der offen gegenaufklärerischen Stellung des katholischen Denkers Windischmann, der damals angestrebt hat, die H.sche Philosophie mit den glänzenden, aber unsystematischen Anschauungen J. de Maistres zu versöhnen. Die freundlichen Beziehungen zwischen H. und Windischmann, die nur der Verdacht eines Plagiats (1829) beenden sollte, finden von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus eine merkwürdige Bestätigung; die Vertrautheit mit Hinrichs' Geistesentwicklung wird gleichfalls erweitert.

Bordignon, Michaela: I limiti dell'interpretazione coerentista della dialettica hegeliana. [The limits of the coherentistic interpretation of Hegelian dialectic.] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 83–134.

The aim of this paper is the analysis of the coherentistic interpretations of H.ian dialectic and of the role contradiction plays in it. In the coherentist interpretation contradiction is characterized by its classical semantic and syntactic meaning. This does not imply a denial of the principle of non contradiction, because the focus of this interpretation is on the negative-critical role contradiction plays in the dialectical process. Contradiction is the symptom of the abstractness and one-sidedness of the determinations of the Understanding. Insofar as contradictory, these determination are false. The negation of the assumptions entailing the contradiction – the abstractedness and one-sidedness – and the affirmation of the opposite assumption – the relational nature of the determination of question – are implied. This relational nature is the unity of opposite determinations, which is the concrete truth of the determinations themselves. In this essential relation the abstractedness of Understanding and the contradiction it entails are completely resolved. In this perspective, contradiction has simply an epistemological meaning. Any ontological value of this notion is gotten rid of, and the value of the principle of non contradiction is not threatened. This seems to be a happy picture of H.ian dialectic, in as much as coherence is palatable and suitable for contemporary philosophical sensibility. Nevertheless, this way of conceiving of dialectic and contradiction is not effective in three respects, whose analysis is outlined in the second part of the paper: (1) The coherentist interpretation is not an effective actualization of H.s notion of contradiction as *regula veri*. The research on paraconsistent logical systems and especially on dialetheism represents a more faithful and interesting way to return to H.s thesis of the truth of contradiction and to shed light on the revolutionary character of this thesis with respect to standard logic; (2) this reading shows to provide a wrong account of the way contradictions arise in dialectical process and of the value contradiction has with respect to the concrete nature of logical determinations; (3) moreover, the coherentist interpretations that think of dialectic as a semantic theory turn out to be built on a wrong assumption on the relation between thinking and natural language.

Bosch, Magdalena: Belleza en el arte y en la naturaleza: la aparente discrepancia entre Hegel y Schelling. [Schönheit in Kunst und Natur: die offensichtliche Diskrepanz zwischen Hegel und Schelling.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G.W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 281–289.

Braffman, Jacques: Discours, langage et totalité (Hegel et Saussure). — In: *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*. Paris. 66 (2010), 2, 265–285.

Verf. identifiziert die (philosophische) Wahrheit mit einem sprachlichen Prozeß. Die Prämisse dieses Prozesses, dessen Struktur H. gefunden habe, könne wie folgt formuliert werden: zu sein ist, gesagt zu werden. Das Resultat dieses Prozesses sei, daß wir nichts sagen, solange wir nicht alles sagen. Die Wahrheit sei also eine sprachliche Selbst-Reflexion, welche lt. Verf. sowohl bei H. als auch bei Saussure entwickelt wird.

Brauer, Daniel: Razón y locura en la antropología de Hegel. [Vernunft und Wahnsinn in der Anthropologie Hegels.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G.W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 181–191.

Burke, Victoria I: Hegel, Antigone, and First-Person Authority. — In: *Philosophy and literature*. Baltimore, MD. 34, (2010), 2, 373–381.

A literary criticism of Sophocles' novel *Antigone* is presented. It mentions that H. considered this novel as the finest tragedy. H. concluded his *Aesthetics* by writing that *Antigone* is the most magnificent and satisfying work of art of him. It is noted that *Antigone* is positioned between H.'s aesthetics and his religion philosophy. At the core of *Antigone* is a funeral rite, which is considered the oldest and most universal of all religious rituals.

Cacciatore, Giuseppe. Hegel e la metafora. [Hegel und die Metapher.] — In: *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*. Milano. 1 (2010), 123–131.

Carbó Ribugent, Mònica: Nostalgia de Grecia en la filosofía del joven Hegel. [Griechenland-Nostalgie in der Philosophie des jungen Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 241–247.

Cariolato, Alfonso: Pensare incondizionatamente la condizione (Heidegger, il Sofista di Platone e Hegel). [Denke bedingungslos die Bedingung (Heidegger, Platons Sophistes und Hegel).] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 45–81.

The essay examines the notion of the unconditioned and of condition (*“das Unbedingte and das Bedingen”*) within Heidegger's work in order to comprehend its value, clear up its different significations and investigate the role of the unconditioned within a “finished thought,” i.e. of a thought that radically assumes what Heidegger himself calls the “getting over” (*“Verwindung”*) of metaphysics. These are recurring key concepts in Heidegger's work, where they are approached and dealt with in different ways over the years. Yet it is in his 1924/25 lectures on Plato's *Sophist* that the issue imposes itself with its full strength and indirectly opens the exigency of a confrontation with H. If Heidegger sets with Plato a problem which he will never cease thinking about, his implicit dialogue with H. will take place on the basis of a question which could be formulated as follows: which unconditioned goes along with things giving themselves?

Carlisle, Clare: Signs of the Times: Kierkegaard's Diagnosis and Treatment of Hegelian Thought. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*. London, UK. 61 (2010), 45–60.

Casuso, Gianfranco: Libertad e inclusión. Reflexiones sobre el concepto de integración política en Hegel. [Freiheit und Inklusion. Reflexionen über das Konzept der politischen Integration bei Hegel.] — In: *Areté. Revista de Filosofía*. Lima, PE. 22 (2010), 1, 7–26.

Starting from a short description of the features of the communitarian model of social integration with the purpose of keeping one's distance and of clarifying some misunderstandings concerning its bonds with the H.'ian *“Sittlichkeit,”* this paper analyzes some of H.'s key texts in which his understanding of the political unity is appreciated. Connected to this, there is an attempt to

reconstruct the notion of integration that follows from those texts so that we can finally conclude with some reflections on the potentiality of a theory of H.ian inspiration for analyzing certain phenomena tied at present with the concepts of social disintegration and exclusion.

Choza Armenta, Jacinto Luis: Sustancia, sujeto y comunicación: la antropología filosófica de Hegel. [Substanz, Subjekt und Kommunikation: die philosophische Anthropologie bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga.* 15 (2010), 1, 43–62.

Church, Jeffrey: The Freedom of Desire: Hegel's Response to Rousseau on the Problem of Civil Society. — In: *American Journal of Political Science.* Houston, US-TX. 54 (2010), 1, 125–139.

The ever-growing body of literature on civil society can benefit from a return to the original theoretical articulation and defense of the concept in the work of H. Specifically, this article suggests that Jean-Jacques Rousseau's influential critique of civil society remains unanswered and argues that H. responded with a sweeping and sympathetic institutional design that remains relevant today. H. agrees with Rousseau that commercial society aggravates the dissatisfaction of its members, and that educating individual desire through institutional design is necessary to solve this difficulty. However, modern states need not adopt Rousseau's extreme and impracticable solution. H.'s concrete, market-based associations of civil society render desires satiable and elevate them to accord with the common good, while still maintaining the freedom and distinctness of a pluralistic modern society.

Comninel, George: Emancipation in Marx's Early Work. — In: *Socialism and Democracy. The journal of the Research Group on Socialism and Democracy.* London/New York. 24 (2010), 3, 60–78.

Crisafi, Anthony/Gallagher, Shaun: Hegel and the extended mind. — In: *AI & Society.* Luxemburg/Berlin. 25 (2010), 1, 123–129.

We examine the theory of the extended mind, and especially the concept of the “parity principle” (Clark and Chalmers in: *Analysis.* Oxford. 58 [1998], 1, 7–19), in light of H.'s notion of objective spirit. This unusual combination of theories raises the question of how far one can extend the notion of extended mind and whether cognitive processing can supervene on the operations of social practices and institutions. We raise some questions about putting this research to critical use.

Cubo Ugarte, Óscar: Los dos lados del saber absoluto en la Fenomenología del Espíritu de Hegel. [Die beiden Seiten des absoluten Wissens in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 255–266.

This paper reconstructs one of the most discussed texts of H.'s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Our fundamental purpose is to show “the two sides of the Absolute Knowledge.” Therefore, we present the extent and sense this latter figure of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has in the project of a “science of the experience of conscience.” Then we show the two sides of the mentioned “Absolute Knowledge.”: the first, the memory (“*An-denken*”) of all that has happened to the conscience, and the second, the liberation of any opposition of the conscience and the access to the true element of the science.

Cubo Ugarte, Óscar: Hegel: anatomía y genealogía del arte. [Hegel: Anatomie und Genealogie der Kunst.] Despalabro: Ensayos de humanidades. Madrid. 4 (2010), 73–85.

For H., the notion of anatomy implies that what you analyze are parts of an inert body and that these parts coexisted and cohabited in an organic whole before you started to analyze. The analysis and knowledge of a body's parts are, no doubt, necessary, but through them you lose the organic and joint dimension of the object of your study. This attitude of the anatomy corresponds structurally to what H. calls the faculty of understanding in the “Preface” of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. What we show in this paper is that, for his speculative thinking, H. needs still another dimension to be able to apprehend the evolution of art's history and that this dimension can be provided exclusively by reason, the only faculty capable of giving a “genealogical” perspective of art.

de Diego González, Antonio: Hegel, el cisne de Pesaro y la encarnación sensible de la Idea. [Hegel, Pesaros Schwan und die sensible Verkörperung der Idee.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 291–299.

Dunson III, James A.: Hegel's Phenomenology: Revival of Socratic Ignorance. — In: *Idealistic Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Charlottesville, Va. 40 (2010), 3, 201–214.

H. is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard's Socratic revival, H. is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a ‘systematic’ form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing H.'s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce H. to a foil for either Kant or Kierkegaard reveals his own inheritance of a Socratic ethic. I argue that H. revives a long-suppressed form of moral and practical philosophy: of one's self-understanding that involves both self-knowledge and self-transformation. Understanding the way in which H. resurrects and reinterprets this conception of moral philosophy requires that one pay attention to the close connection between his systematic method and his unique version of skepticism.

Engelhardt, Jr., H. Tristram: Moral Obligation after the Death of God: Critical Reflections on Concerns from Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel and Elisabeth Anscombe. — In: *Social philosophy & policy*. Cambridge, UK. 27 (2010), 2, 317–341.

Once God is no longer recognized as the ground and the enforcer of morality, the character and force of morality undergoes a significant change, a point made by G. E. M. Anscombe in her observation that without God the significance of morality is changed, as the word criminal would be changed if there were no criminal law and criminal courts. There is no longer in principle a God's-eye perspective from which one can envisage setting moral pluralism aside. In addition, it becomes impossible to show that morality should always trump concerns of prudence, concerns for one's own non-moral interests and the interests of those to whom one is close. Kant's attempt to maintain the unity of morality and the force of moral obligation by invoking the idea of God and the postulates of pure practical reason (i.e., God and immortality) are explored and assessed. H.s reconstruction of the status of moral obligation is also examined, given his attempt to eschew Kant's thing-in-itself, as well as Kant's at least possible transcendent God. Severed from any metaphysical anchor, morality gains a contingent content from socio-historical context and its enforcement from the state. H.s disengagement from a transcendent God marks a watershed in the place of God in philosophical reflections regarding the status of moral obligations on the European continent. Anscombe is vindicated. Absent the presence of God, there is an important change in the force of moral obligation.

Ezquerro Gómez, Jesús: La razón de la sinrazón: comentario a la tesis hegeliana: „Lo que es racional es real; lo que es real es racional“. [Die Vernunft der Unvernunft: Kommentar zu Hegels These: „Was ist vernünftig ist, ist wirklich; was wirklich ist, ist vernünftig“.] — In: *Estudios filosóficos*. Salamanca. 59 (2010), 170, 163–173.

Ezquerro Gómez, Jesús: La voluntad libre en Hegel. [Der freie Wille bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes: Revista interdisciplinar de filosofía. Málaga. 15 (2010), 147–166.

This paper re-examines the H.ian conception of free volition as it is put forward mainly in the introduction of *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. According to H. the will, being practical conscience, creates its object. For that reason the will can be recognized in this object. This creation is freedom. So what the free will wants is the free will itself. To be free is, therefore, the will to be free. In my opinion this thesis shows the revolutionary character of H.s political thought.

Fagerström, Lisbeth/Bergbom, Ingegerd: The Use of Hegelian Dialectics in Nursing Science. — In: *Nursing Science Quarterly*. Thousand Oaks, CA. 23 (2010), 1, 79–84.

The aim of this column is to describe dialectics as a philosophy and method which can be used by nurses to make a contribution to nursing science. Dialectics can be used in three ways: as a philosophical approach, as a method using the dialectic laws, and as a method of describing the dialectic process by focusing on the dynamic elements of the process. Dialectics can also be combined with hermeneutics.

Falgueras Salinas, Ignacio: Lógica formal, lógica de contenidos y tiempo en Hegel. [Formale Logik, inhaltliche Logik und Zeit bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 63–86.

Feola, Michael: Truth and illusion in the philosophy of right: Hegel and liberalism. — In: Philosophy & Social Criticism. London. 36 (2010), 5, 567–585.

It is often thought that H.'s social philosophy is straightforwardly hostile toward liberal ideals. In this article, I contend that many such suspicions can be dispelled through a more nuanced engagement with his rhetorical and argumentative strategies. To tackle such a broad topic in this space, I focus on the shortcomings of a rights-based individualism within the *Philosophy of Right* — where H. describes civil society as a semblance (“Schein”) of a rational polity. Although such passages might suggest the collectivism that has long haunted his legacy, I propose that he is offering something rather more normatively attractive. More specifically, I argue that his grammar of recognition disinters the suppressed social conditions for those rights (and the individuality they protect) that are often misrecognized as foundational by liberal theorists.

Fernández Gómez, Rosa María: El arte indio de Hegel: extravagancia natural. [Die indische Kunst bei Hegel: natürliche Extravaganz.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 301–309.

Ficara, Elena: Ursprünge des Ausdrucks ‘Das Logische’ beim frühen Hegel. — In: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Hamburg. 52 (2010), 113–127.

The article analyses H.'s use of the expression “das Logische” in the *Encyclopaedia Logic* and its origins in the Logic of *Jena Systementwürfe II*. My thesis is that the use of the expression reveals the typically H.'ian view of the identity of logic and metaphysics. As H. himself underlines in the *Encyclopaedia*, while the more canonical expression “die Logik” primarily refers to the discipline and its methods, “das Logische” refers to the object, to say the thematic field, of the discipline. This perfectly complies with H.'s conception according to which concepts are not only instruments and forms but also objects and contents. In the Jena fragments H. repeatedly uses a particular declination of the expression “das Logische,” namely: “das Dialektische.” This shows in my point of view that the Jena logic is already conceived as metaphysics, and that dialectics is the very core of the identity of logic and metaphysics.

Ficara, Elena: Immagini della dialettica hegeliana. Osservazioni su „La croce e la rosa“. [Figures of Hegelian Dialectics. Observations on “The Cross and the Rose.”] — In: Archivio di storia della cultura. Napoli. XXIII (2010), 271–285.

This essay analyses H.'s use of the metaphor of “the cross and the rose,” not only in the Preface to the *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, which all major interpretations refer to, but also in two other texts: *Wer denkt abstrakt?* of 1807 and the 1829 review of Schubart's and Garganico's *Über Philosophie überhaupt ...*. In *Wer denkt abstrakt?* H. criticizes a sentimental, as equivalent to a “non concrete,” interpretation of the figure; in the Preface he claims that “reason is the rose in the cross

of the present,” assimilating the image to a platonic idea of State; in the review of 1829 he criticizes a naive interpretation of the figure. In the light of these observations, it is possible to conclude that H. sees the figure as the specific image of the relation of the platonic and the critical element, typical of dialectical rationality. The H.ian use of the figure thus results, in this perspective, by far more subtle than the one envisaged by its “political” interpretations of it.

Forman, David: Second Nature and Spirit: Hegel on the Role of Habit in the Appearance of Perceptual Consciousness. — In: *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Memphis, TN. 48 (2010), 4, 325–353.

H.'s discussion of the concept of 'habit' appears at a crucial point in his *Encyclopedia* system, namely, in the transition from the topic of 'nature' to the topic of 'spirit' ("Geist"): it is through habit that the subject both distinguishes itself from its various sensory states as an absolute unity (the I) and, at the same time, preserves those sensory states as the content of sensory consciousness. By calling habit a 'second nature,' H. highlights the fact that incipient spirit retains a 'moment' of the natural that marks a limitation compared to 'pure thought' but that also makes perceptual consciousness possible. This makes H.'s account analogous in important respects to John McDowell's 'naturalism of second nature.' But H.'s account of habit can be seen as a version of a Kantian synthesis of the productive imagination – and hence presupposes a given material that can become one's own by means of habit. This does not mean that H. falls into the Myth of the given, but it does suggest that an appropriate account of second nature might be committed to something McDowell wants to deny: that non conceptual states of consciousness play a role (even if not a justificatory role) in perception.

Gabriel, Markus: ¿Contingencia o necesidad? Schelling y Hegel acerca del estatus modal del espacio lógico. [Kontingenz oder Notwendigkeit? Schelling und Hegel über den modalen Status des logischen Raums.] — In: *Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía*. Bogotá, CO. 142 (2010), 5–23.

Gallego Franco, Santiago: La positividad del Cristianismo en los Escritos de Juventud de Hegel. [Die Positivität des Christentums in Hegels Jugendschriften.] — In: *Teología y cultura*. 7 (2012), 12, 69–77.

Gambarotto, Andrea: Struttura e significato metacategoriale della soggettività nella logica di Hegel. [Struktur und metakategoriale Bedeutung der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik.] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 215–249.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of the concept of subjectivity in H.'s *Science of Logic*. I put forward the theory that H.'s idea of subjectivity differs in a significant way from modern subjectivism and from transcendental philosophy, and has rather to be seen as a logical relationship marked by self-reflection, which for H. is also the conceptual structure of freedom. The analysis moves from H.'s critique of the *Reflexionsphilosophien* in Jena and focuses on different forms of reflection both in the 'Objective Logic' and in the 'Subjective Logic,' to show that this particular relationship is found not only in the sections which expressively deal with subjectivity, but in the *Science of Logic* as a whole.

Gámez Millán, Sebastián: Autointerpretación del yo a través de las expresiones literarias: arte y verdad a partir de Hegel. [Selbstdeutung des Ich durch literarische Ausdrücke: Kunst und Wahrheit bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Bentivegna (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 325–333.

García Martín, José: Comunidad vs. individuo: una lectura kierkegaardiana de la religión consumada en las Lecciones de la religión de Hegel. [Gemeinschaft vs. Individuum: eine Kierkegaardianische Lektüre der vollendeten Religion in den Vorlesungen über die Religion bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Bentivegna (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 363–374.

Gérard, Gilbert: Hegel et la fin de la philosophie. — In: Archives de Philosophie. Paris. 73 (2010), 2, 249–266.

L'article part du constat que la philosophie est pour H. un phénomène essentiellement tardif, qui, de façon générale, n'advient qu'à la fin, là où l'histoire s'achève, qu'il s'agisse de celle, particulière, d'un peuple déterminé ou de l'histoire universelle. Que signifie donc pareille localisation „eschatologique“ de la philosophie? Il s'agit, pour répondre à pareille question, de clarifier en l'analysant la signification complexe de la notion de fin ici en jeu. La fin, ce n'est pas seulement ce qui vient en dernier, c'est aussi et essentiellement le lieu d'accomplissement où la vérité se manifeste en plénitude – et c'est la raison pour laquelle la philosophie ne se produit qu'à la fin. Mais, de manière de prime abord surprenante, cet accomplissement est en même temps synonyme de désagrégation et de mort: c'est seulement là où elle est en déclin et en crise qu'une époque parvient à sa vérité en se réfléchissant philosophiquement. Ce qui, à son tour, n'est toutefois pas à entendre de façon purement négative, mais bien dans le sens proprement dialectique d'une négation qui maintient ce qu'elle supprime en le transformant. Ainsi, tandis qu'elle exprime la vérité de son temps en déclin, une philosophie ouvre simultanément une nouvelle époque dont elle constitue l'amorce abstraite en attente de son effectuation. La question soulevée par l'article est alors la suivante: dans quelle mesure cette analyse du caractère tardif de la philosophie est-elle transposable à la propre philosophie de H., quand on sait qu'il situe celle-ci nécessairement à „la fin des temps“ en tant que savoir absolu accompli qui vient clôturer, en en élucidant le sens, le développement historique de la philosophie depuis les Grecs? La thèse ici défendue est que, loin de toute espèce de dogmatisme métaphysique qui prétendrait figer définitivement la vérité en son accomplissement absolu, la „fin de la philosophie“ que H. entend sceller dans son système n'est en aucune façon une fin sans lendemain; elle ouvre au contraire une nouvelle époque de l'esprit, celle – décisive – où surmontant le dogmatisme persistant qui grevait sa réflexion au sein de l'histoire de la philosophie écoulée, l'esprit se restitue à son inquiétude essentielle en se réfléchissant en vérité comme esprit libre.

Gérard, Gilbert: Le commandement de l'esprit. Lecture du § 377 de l'Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques (1827/1830) de Hegel. — In: Revue Science et Esprit. Ottawa, ON. 62 (2010), 1, 5–16.

In der zweiten und dritten Auflage der *Enzyklopädie* präsentiert H. die Selbsterkenntnis als das „absolute Gebot“ des Geistes. Wie sollte man einen solchen Befehl innerhalb des Mittelpunkts des

Geistes, welcher die höchste Definition des Absoluten ausmacht, verstehen? Deutlich kritisiert H. solche Philosophien, die ein bloßes „Sollen“ zum Resultat haben. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, sei es zunächst nötig, den Geist innerhalb H.s System genau zu verorten, um seine wahre Natur zu begreifen, welche als Wirklichkeit zu verstehen ist. Sodann wird gezeigt, daß H. das „Sollen“ – und er ist weit davon entfernt, es einfach zu verwerfen – im Gegenteil im Zentrum seines dynamischen Begriffs der Wahrheit als Geist aufbewahrt.

Gérard, Gilbert: Apparaître et manifestation de l'esprit dans la „Phénoménologie“ et l'„Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques“ de Hegel. — In: *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. Louvain. 108 (2010), 1, 53–70.

Ziel dieses Artikels ist, die gesamte Struktur des H.schen Systems (*Phänomenologie des Geistes* und *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*) als ein System des Geistes zu erklären. An und für sich selbst zu sein, ist als Geist-Definition in den beiden Hauptwerken H.s unterschiedlich entwickelt. Der Grund und die Konsequenzen dieses Unterschieds werden analysiert.

Giuspoli, Paolo: „In der Tat ist der Geist der eigentliche Idealist“: idealità e oggettività nella filosofia dello spirito soggettivo di Hegel. [Idealität und Objektivität in Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes.] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 3–44.

Nowadays, we tend to explain H.s idealism by making reference to the concepts of a transcendent mind or an absolute I. However, H. himself regarded such concepts to be unusable for science. H. asserts that thought makes man free from the world as it is given. At the same time, he showed that liberation through thought does not mean just a subjective and mere abstract achievement. Most of H.s work aims to demonstrate that thought is not only what we usually mean by 'thought.' It is not only the arbitrary and contingent product of an individual mind, in the first place because it does not coincide at all with a mere aphoristic product of mind. Consequently the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has to be regarded as a theory of freedom that becomes accessible to man because of his capability of idealizing what appears, going beyond the picture of an already given reality, made of fragments of world, external bounds and isolated lives.

Gómez, Jesús Ezquerro: ¿Una temporalidad eónica? (Tiempo y reflexión en Hegel). [Eine aionische Zeitlichkeit? (Zeit und Reflexion bei Hegel).] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo*. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. *Contrastes*. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 193–200.

Gómez-Zorrilla Sanjuán, Lucas: Encuentros postmodernos con Hegel. [Postmoderne Begegnungen mit Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo*. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. *Contrastes*. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 421–429.

Good, Jim: Dewey, Hegel and Causation. — In: *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. Baltimore, MD. 24 (2010), 2, 101–120.

Green, Karen: Women, Hegel, and Recognition in the Second Sex. — In: *Hypatia*. Bloomington, IN. 25 (2010), 2, 376–393.

This paper develops a new account of Beauvoir's "Hegelianism" and argues that the strand of contemporary interpretation of Beauvoir that seeks to represent her thought in isolation from that of Jean-Paul Sartre constitutes a betrayal of the philosophy of recognition that she derives from H. It underscores the extent to which Beauvoir influenced Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and shows that Sartre and Beauvoir both adapted H.'s ideas and agreed in rejecting his optimism.

Gretic, Goran: Politička instrumentalizacija filozofije u Heideggerovu tumačenju Hegela. Obrana Hegela. [Die politische Instrumentalisierung der Philosophie in Heideggers Hegel-Interpretation.] — In: *Politicka Misao: Croatian Political Science Review*. Zagreb. 47 (2010), 3, 62–79.

The author discusses Heidegger's seminars *On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History and State* (1933/1934) and *Hegel on the State* (1934/1935). The only recently published seminars shed a particular light on the relation between Heidegger's thought and National Socialism. This article primarily investigates Heidegger's interpretation of H.'s definition of the concept, role and task of the state. The author shows that Heidegger's interpretation is in fact an attempt to justify, through arbitrary interpretation of H., his own interpretation and justification of the national-socialist state and its leader as the pinnacle of the Western philosophical understanding of the state.

Herráiz Martínez, Pedro José: El mal antropológico en Hegel. [Das anthropologische Böse bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 383–390.

Herrero, Montserrat: Dialéctica y esperanza: reflexiones sobre un apunte de E. Bloch a la dialéctica histórica de Hegel. [Dialektik und Hoffnung: Überlegungen zu einer Bemerkung von E. Bloch zu der historischen Dialektik Hegels.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 201–212.

Hoff, Shannon: Law, Love, and Life. — In: *Philosophy Today*. Chicago, IL. 54 (2010), 163–168.

The article discusses the relation between law and reason and forgiveness and affective relations on the other. It identifies the problems involved in making law the basis of justice and morality, as well as argues that in the early philosophy of H., there is an alternative model of moral judgment, social criticism and justice that is rooted in affect and forgiveness. It concludes that the ultimate value of law allows common practices of interaction to sediment.

Ingram, David: Recognition Within the Limits of Reason: Remarks on Pippin's Hegel's Practical Philosophy. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 470–490.

In *Hegel's Practical Philosophy* (2008), Robert Pippin argues that H.'s mature concept of recognition is properly understood as an ontological category referring exclusively to what it means to be a free, rational individual, or agent. I agree with Pippin that recognition for H. functions in this capacity. However, I shall argue that conceiving it this way also requires that we conceive it as a political category. Furthermore, while H. insists that recognition must be concrete – mediated by actors who hold one another accountable according to institutional norms implicit in their actual social roles – I argue, appealing to H. himself, that social crisis impels actors to transcend their roles and adopt abstract points of view more in keeping with philosophical forms of reflection. Such alienation – so ardently embraced by postmodernists – need not undermine the possibility of recognition as an ontological category, as Pippin fears, but rather comports with the expressivity theory of action he imputes to H., which describes the socially recognized intentions, rationales, and identities – not to mention, freedom – of actors as unfolding in interminable dialogue.

Jaime Galván, José de Jesús: The configuration of our horizon of experience and judgment as a dynamic process: some considerations about the laboratory of consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G.W.F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 267–273.

The moment Consciousness of H.'s *Phenomenology of Spirit* still offers a brilliant philosophical perspective in making explicit the constant, complex and dynamic process implicated in the construction of our horizon of experience, consistent with the equally complex and dynamic universe we inhabit and strive to understand. H.'s exposition also contributes to recognize an eminent illustration of such permanent co-shaping process in the vertiginous transformations of the many devices that mediate the relationship between the world and us, particularly those observed in scientific instruments.

James, David: Art and Ethical Life: The Social and Historical Background to Hegel's Reflections on Ancient and Modern Literature in the "Mit"- and "Nachschriften" of his Lectures on Aesthetics. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Special Issue on Hegel and Literature*. London, UK. 62 (2010), 83–100.

Jenkins, Scott: Hegel on Space: A Critique of Kant's Transcendental Philosophy. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 4, 326–356.

This paper considers H.'s views on space and his account of Kant's theory of space. I show that H.'s discussions of space exhibit a deep understanding of Kant's apriority argument in the first *Critique*, commit him to the central premise of that argument, and separate his concerns from the familiar problem of the neglected alternative. Nevertheless, H. makes two objections to Kant's theory of space. First, he argues that the theory is internally inconsistent insofar as Kant's identification of space with an a priori intuition is incompatible with the doctrine of productive imagination in the transcendental deduction of the categories. Second, H. argues that the apriority argument is insufficiently critical insofar as it relies upon an unexamined theory of subjectivity as a set of

representational capacities. I conclude by outlining H.s strategy for undermining the assumptions concerning subjectivity that give form to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Because H.s positive views on space depend upon his articulation of an alternate notion of subjectivity, the account of H.s position on space offered here remains incomplete. On the other hand, considering H.s discussions of space demonstrates both the nature and the importance of his examination of subjectivity in the *Phenomenology*.

Jiménez, Mauro: Diferencia y dialéctica en Hegel. [Differenz und Dialektik bei Hegel.] — In: *Endoxa: Series Filosóficas*. Madrid. 26 (2010), 63–86.

Johnston, Scott: Dewey's 'Naturalized Hegelianism' in Operation: Experimental Inquiry as Self-Consciousness. — In: *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy*. New York. 46 (2010), 3, 453–476.

The article discusses the concepts of the self, consciousness, and self-consciousness in the articles *Experience and Nature* and *Art as Experience* by the American philosopher John Dewey. It describes the relation between the developmental and dialectical understanding of self-consciousness developed by H. and Dewey's understanding of the natural and active conscience. The article then describes Dewey's understanding of the consciousness as a series of activities or faculties, the cognitive aspects of intellectual and experimental inquiry and its relation to consciousness, and the relation between Dewey's writings and H.s *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

José Binetti, María: El estadio estético de Kierkegaard en las categorías lógicas de Hegel: inmediatez, reflexión y posibilidad formal. [Kierkegaards æsthetische Stufe in den logischen Kategorien Hegels: Unmittelbarkeit, Reflexion und formale Möglichkeit.] — In: *Enfoques*. San Martín, RA. XXII (2010), 1, 31–51.

The present paper analyzes the Kierkegaardian aesthetical stage in order to show how its internal dynamism confirms in singular existence some categories, which Hegel's *Logic* affirms as structure and meaning of reality as a whole. Thus, the author sets out to address the topic which contrasts Kierkegaardian and Hegelian thoughts, as she points out the coincidences of a same metaphysical fundamental orientation.

Jubara, Annett: Universalism in cultural history and the meaning of the Russian Revolution: on some aspects of cultural theory in the work of Mikhail Lifšic. — In: *Studies in East European Thought*. Luxemburg/Berlin. 62 (2010), 3/4, 299–314.

Mikhail Lifšic (1905–1983) is one of the most contradictory and to this date poorly understood authors of the Soviet era. He represented an independent Marxist position, but one internally characterized by the tense relationship between Marxism and the philosophy of H. This relationship, concerning historical philosophical questions, is the subject of this essay. In the 1930s, as 'historical materialism' was canonized in the USSR, a development that Soviet civilization understood as the 'beginning of the end of (universal) history,' Lifšic drafted a different, skeptical summary of the revolutionary era. However, he remained loyal to both the concept of universal history and the examination of Russian-Soviet cultural history within the framework of this concept. With the help of a text from Lifšic from the 1930s as well as his later (early 1980s) reflection and remembrance of the ideological debates of the 1930s, this essay will show that Lifšic's reconstruction of idealism in

Marxism was no accident, but rather a necessary movement in thought. This, in turn, enabled him to give a new account of the historical experience of the October Revolution.

Kainz, Howard P.: Hegel's Phenomenology: Reverberations in his later system. — In: *Idealistic Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Charlottesville, VA. 40 (2010), 3, 235–241.

H. indicates toward the end of his *Phenomenology of Spirit* that there would be a parallelism in the categories of his later system to the various configurations of consciousness in the *Phenomenology*. Some general correspondences have been indicated by Otto Pöggeler and suggested by Robert Grant McRae, but I argue in this paper that there are at least four important and more specific parallels, bringing out simultaneously a similarity of content and a difference of approach and methodology in the two works: 1) in the philosophical construal of “categories;” 2) in the conceptualization of a “phenomenology;” 3) in the analysis of the dialectical relationship of religion and art; and 4) in the relationship of the history of philosophy to the Absolute.

Kainz, Howard P.: Hegelian Priorities in Christendom: a Reconsideration. — In: *Philosophy & Theology*. Charlottesville, VA. 22 (2010), 1/2, 265–277.

Arguments from the nineteenth century concerning whether H. was an atheist or a theist are still ongoing. This paper examines H.'s philosophical and theological milieu, his influence on the history of philosophy and on politics, his unique interpretation of the unity of theology and philosophy, and his unusually sanguine interpretation of the relationship between church and state, along with special problems he discerned in the emergence of democracies.

Kelly, Sean K.: Leopold von Sacher-Masoch and Human Rights. — In: *Modern Austrian Literature*. Burlington, VT. 43 (2010), 3, 19–37.

The article outlines how a literary concept of human rights develops within the works of author Leopold von Sacher-Masoch. It defines the role that Sacher-Masoch understands human and universal rights to play in a state in which the sum total of its citizens' intelligences is respected. However, the natural rights philosophers in general, particularly H., are in contrast with Sacher-Masoch's vision.

Knabe, Georgy: Hegel, Europe and the Turn of the Millennia. — In: *Social Sciences. A Quarterly Journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences*. Minneapolis/Moscow. 41 (2010), 2, 50–65.

The article discusses the interrelationship of the H.ian philosophy and Europe in the 20th and 21st centuries. It states that H. was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Aristotle. He illustrates the diverse and uneven though consistent and steady manifestation of the antique and Aristotelian legacy in European philosophy. The history and theory of European culture stands on the principle of individualism which differentiates the European type of culture from other world cultures. The simple and early idea of H.'s philosophy concerning the disparity between the particular and the whole symbolizes the inner form of the spiritual and historical being of Europe.

Kögler, Hans-Herbert: Recognition and the Resurgence of Intentional Agency. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 450–469.

By engaging Robert Pippin's H.ian account of 'rational agency as ethical life,' the essay explores the consequences of an intersubjectivist conception of ethical agency. Pippin's core project consists of showing that intentional agency must be conceived within the social context of reason-giving practices which provide the necessary sense-making background of action. This socially grounded meaningfulness of action requires us to redefine agency as a social achievement, as real only if socially recognized. For Pippin, this means that ethical agency essentially becomes the identifying expression of the situated agent with rationally acceptable and socially actualized modes of self-realization. In contrast, I argue that core features of agency such as intentional causality and reflexivity need to be more fully integrated into a social conception of agency. By drawing on a hermeneutic appropriation of G. H. Mead's intersubjective account, we come to see that the developing self emerges via processes of perspective-taking which involve intentional causality as well as reflexivity. The presumed opposition between an intentional-causalist and an expressivity account of agency thus becomes obsolete. The new account is put to a comparative test with Pippin's approach with regard to the issues of analyzing social power, approaching cultural difference, and conceiving of the relation between critical theory and the agents' everyday social self-understanding.

Kontou, Angeliki D.: Subjectivity and temporality in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Bentivegna (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 213–227.

Krasicki, Jan: "The tragedy" of German philosophy. Remarks on reception of German philosophy in the Russian religious thought (of S. Bulgakov and others). — In: *Studies in East European Thought*. Luxemburg/Berlin 62 (2010), 1, 63–70.

The article deals with Bulgakov's critique of H.'s monistic system. For Bulgakov, H.ian monism is an example of philosophical reductionism which aims at reducing the question of Being, the latter expressed by a proposition and constituted by the inseparable unity of three elements (person as hypostasis, its meaning and the essence of Being), to its second principle. Contrary to H., Bulgakov claims that no philosophy can begin with and as itself – it has to be initiated with a datum. This is in fact where the tragedy of German philosophy, and each monistic philosophy, starts.

Lai, Amy: Hegel, the Tiananmen Incident and Falun Gong. — In: *European Journal of East Asian Studies*. Leiden. 9 (2010), 1, 119–133.

This paper explores Chinese people's pursuit of human rights through the H.ian lenses of abstract rights and the master-slave dialectic. By juxtaposing the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the Falun Gong movement, it illuminates how Chinese people's struggles for human rights have been informed by Confucianism and other Chinese philosophies, although they have also looked to the West for inspiration and endorsement. Moreover, H.'s very own dialectic reassures us that Chinese people do not need to have an affirmative, conscious knowledge of 'rights' before they pursue them. While the student protests in 1989 were fuelled by a nationwide economic crisis, the Falun Gong movement was the result of an increasingly prosperous but spiritually blighted society. In both cases, the people, like slaves, struggled against their master, the Chinese government, for freedom and recognition so as to attain a full self-consciousness. Thus, this paper appropriates H.ian concepts

and his dialectical view of history to add to the existing criticisms of his Orientalist views, namely his belief that China is a stagnant nation and its people have no independent personality but only a servile consciousness.

Lauth, Reinhard: Hegel ante la Doctrina de la ciencia. [Hegel vor der Wissenschaftslehre.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 109–112.*

Lejeune, Guillaume: *Système et langage chez Hegel à la lumière du concept logique de „paraconsistance“.* — In: *Revue Mosaïque. Revue des jeunes chercheurs en Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société Lille Nord de France – Belgique francophone. 4 (2010), 67–85.* (URL: <http://revuemosaïque.net>)

Eine Darstellung des Absoluten an und für sich selbst scheint zunächst vor drei Probleme zu stellen: den Status der Autoren, die Position des Lesers und den semantischen Gehalt. Die Idee einer absoluten Rede muß aber wieder gedacht werden. Im Lichte des logischen Begriffs „Parakonsistenz“, der hier i. S. eines heuristischen Werkzeugs gebraucht wird, erscheint H.s Absoluten als die absolute Selbstreferenz, nicht aber als die absolute Referenz. So gesehen erscheinen die Schwierigkeiten der absoluten Rede als Schwierigkeiten, eine bedeutende Erfahrung mitzuteilen.

Lejeune, Guillaume: Hegel et Foucault: l'objectivité moderne de l'aliénation mentale et de son traitement. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 193–203.*

H., by linking the madness to the anthropology, is close to his contemporaries. But, by inserting his anthropology into the global frame of his philosophy of spirit, which connects the intelligence concerning what is man (subjective spirit) with the second nature that man gives to himself (objective spirit), he exceeds the contradictions of “the anthropological circle,” to which Foucault reduces him. For H., the causes of madness are subjective and objective (or social) and their solution is, at first, in the activity, which links the atemporal contradictions of the self-appropriation to the temporal objectivity of the *Sittlichkeit* and signifies this way as well as a psychological stake as a modern and social challenge.

López-Espinosa, Luis Felip: La obscenidad del Sujeto hegeliano: la „noche del mundo“ y la experiencia de la pulsión de muerte. [Die Schamlosigkeit des Hegelianischen Subjekts: die „Nacht der Welt“ und die Erfahrung des Todestriebs.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 205–216.*

Lott, Dylan Thomas: What Geist would this gift give us: seeing Hegel's "Antropology" in contemporary personology. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G.W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 407–417.*

Low, Douglas: Hegel and Merleau-Ponty on Modernism and Postmodernism. — In: *International Philosophical Quarterly. New York. 50 (2010), 3, 309–323.*

This essay attempts to provide detailed evidence for Charles Taylor's claim that both H. and Merleau-Ponty follow Kant's refutation of idealism in an effort to take a stand against Modernism's claim that human knowledge of the world is reducible to a conceptual representation of it. For both, the H. of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and Merleau-Ponty throughout his career, human consciousness and knowledge must embrace and make sense of a world that is always already there. This stand will be made against Postmodernism as well.

Luque Moya, Gloria: El albor del tiempo: el arte simbólico en el pensamiento hegeliano. [Das Dämmern der Zeit: die symbolische Kunst im Denken Hegels.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G.W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 335–344.*

Margolis, Joseph: A Word of Thanks for Peter Hare's Patience. — In: *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. New York. 46 (2010), 1, 3–8.*

The article discusses the role of philosopher Peter Hare among contending pragmatists. The author looks at Hare's approach to philosophy and states that he intensively wrote about many topics. The author states that interlocking themes in Hare's work include realism, naturalism, and pragmatism. Hare's views on the writings of H. are also addressed. The article also looks at the relationship between epistemology and metaphysics. Hare's role as an intermediary in facilitating the reception of contemporary philosophers is mentioned.

Marmasse, Gilles: Que prouvent chez Hegel les preuves de l'existence de Dieu? — In: *Les Études philosophiques. Paris. 92 (2010), 1, 109–130.*

L'article examine tout d'abord les problèmes, chez H., de la preuve en général et de l'existence de Dieu en général. Puis il examine les différentes formulations des preuves de l'existence de Dieu telles qu'elles sont reprises par H., et notamment celles de la preuve ontologique. L'hypothèse est la suivante: pour H., le Dieu de la religion se fait exister processuellement à l'encontre de ses formes d'existence déficientes. Par là cependant, il se manifeste lui-même, rendant le discours des preuves superflu. Les trois versions de la preuve ontologique – „anselmienne“, „kantienne“ et „hégélienne“ – présentent les trois modes de relation de Dieu comme sujet avec l'objectivité: une unité présupposée, puis niée, et enfin établie comme le résultat d'un processus. Les preuves de l'existence de Dieu, qui restent „representatives“, n'ont pas pour fin d'établir qu'il y a un Dieu en dehors de la pensée, mais de penser Dieu de manière autofondée et donc „vraie“.

Marmasse, Gilles: Problématiques morales dans la „Phénoménologie de l'Esprit“ et l'„Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques“. — In: *Revue philosophique de Louvain*. Louvain. 108 (2010), 1, 71–89.

Der Artikel untersucht zunächst zwei Begriffe der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*: „Die Individualität, welche sich an und für sich selbst reell ist“ (im „Vernunft-Kapitel“) und „die Moralität“ (im „Geist-Kapitel“). Lt. Verf. beruht die Auswertung der Handlung im ersten Fall auf einem einfachen Kriterium der Kohäsion mit sich selbst. Dahingegen werden in der zweiten Gestalt das Sollen und die Sittlichkeit betrachtet und verinnerlicht. Sodann geht es darum, daß es eine analoge Entwicklung der moralischen Fragen im subjektiven und objektiven Geist der *Enzyklopädie* gibt: einerseits eine Handlung, die sich ausschließlich auf das individuelle Ego bezieht; andererseits eine Handlung, die Ansprüche auf sittliche Gültigkeit erhebt.

Martín Navarro, Alejandro: Derivas de la conciencia religiosa entre el romanticismo y Hegel. [Abdriften des religiösen Bewußtseins zwischen Romantik und Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 391–398.

de la Maza Samhaber, Luis Mariano: El sentido del reconocimiento como formación del espíritu en Hegel. [Das Gefühl der Anerkennung als Bildung des Geistes bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 153–172.

de la Maza Samhaber, Luis Mariano: Actualizaciones del concepto hegeliano de reconocimiento. [Aktualisierungen des Hegelschen Begriffs der Anerkennung.] — In: *Veritas. Revista de filosofía y teología*. Lo Vásquez, Casablanca, RCH. 23 (2010), 67–94.

Melamed, Yitzhak Y.: Acosmism or Weak Individuals? Hegel, Spinoza, and the Reality of the Finite. — In: *Journal of the history of philosophy*. Baltimore, MD. 48 (2010), 1, 77–92.

Like many of his contemporaries, H. considered Spinoza a modern reviver of ancient Eleatic monism, in whose system “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void.” This characterization of Spinoza as denying the reality of the world of finite things had a lasting influence on the perception of Spinoza in the two centuries that followed. In this article, I take these claims of H. to task and evaluate their validity. Although H.s official argument for the unreality of modes in Spinoza's system will turn out to be unsound, I do believe there is one crucial line in Spinoza's system – Spinoza's rather weak and functional conception of individuality – that provides some support for H.s reading of Spinoza.

Mendola, Gianluca: *Esperienza e ragione in Hegel. [Erfahrung und Vernunft bei Hegel.]* — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 251–275.

From the systematic relationship between Nature and Mind is possible to reconsider the connection between subject and object as the ground of H.'s concept of objective thought. The progressive sublation of immediacy of the object establishes for H. a rational process that determines the philosophy as science.

Millán, Elizabeth: *Searching for Modern Culture's Beautiful Harmony: Schlegel and Hegel on Irony.* — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Special Issue on Hegel and Literature*. London, UK. 62 (2010), 61–82.

Referencing the three major journals that shaped literary and philosophical discussions in German-speaking lands during the late 1700s, namely, Schiller's *Die Horen* (1795–1797), Goethe's *Propyläen* (1798–1800), and the Schlegel brothers' *Das Athenäum* (1798–1800), we observe that each of them summoned the ancient Greek culture, a summoning born of a nostalgia for the 'beautiful continuity and harmony' of the ancient Greek culture. In the article, I argue that this yearning for the 'beautiful continuity and harmony' of the ancient Greeks, a nostalgia for the lost 'Golden Age' that might just be recovered with the proper cultural centre, marks the period to which Schiller, Goethe, H., and Friedrich Schlegel belonged. Shaping much of the literary production of this period is the belief that literature could unify the fragmented, modern society and return culture to the 'beautiful harmony' invoked by Goethe in the opening *Propyläen* statement. As Goethe, Schiller, and Schlegel turned their attention to art and the fate of culture throughout the late 1700s and early 1800s, each of them took a decidedly ancient turn. H. was no exception to this trend. In this article I consider why, in their turn to art, both H., the German Idealist, and Schlegel, the early German Romantic, turn to the Greeks. While I begin with the common root in the ancients that unites the work of H. and Schlegel, in discussing a particular aspect of literature – namely, irony – I discuss how that common root is torn asunder.

Moyar, Dean Franklin: *Naturalism in Ethics and Hegel's Distinction between Subjective and Objective Spirit.* — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*. London, UK. 61 (2010), 1–22.

Murillo Gómez, José Ignacio: *Vida, afectividad y racionalidad: Hegel y la biología filosófica de Scheler. [Leben, Emotion und Rationalität: Hegel und die philosophische Biologie Schelers.]* — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 225–233.

Neumann Soto, Hardy: *Filosofía, experiencia y conciencia en la „fenomenología del espíritu“: una reflexión en torno al modo de exposición de la verdad filosófica según Hegel. [Philosophie, Erfahrung und Bewußtsein in der „Phänomenologie des Geistes“: eine Reflexion über die Art der Exposition der philosophischen Wahrheit gemäß Hegel.]* — In: *Revista de Filosofía*. Madrid. 66 (2010), 241–260.

Neuser, Wolfgang: Hegels Bestimmung des Verhältnisses von Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. — In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism. Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science. Berlin/Boston.VIII (2010), 207–227.

The term “natural sciences” has a different meaning in the period 1775–1831 than it does in the 21st century. Virtually all the natural sciences, and with them the method of empirical-mathematical research, developed in the West in the first third of the 19th century. However, natural science and the understanding of nature, consequently upon the subjective grounding of knowledge, are since Descartes the test case for the validity of any understanding of knowledge involving the theory of the subject. In a certain sense H. completes Cartesian subjectivism and claims to set out the constitutive rules for the concept that comprehend natural objects in the *Encyclopedia*. This eventuates in an interpretation of “nature” as the “being-in-an-other of the Idea.” From the outset of his philosophical work H. locates the question of the systematic place of nature at the center of his thought, and nature is without doubt of great import for the understanding of the inner-workings of his thought. In the *Encyclopedia* and the glosses on it in his lectures of 1817–27 H. sets out the concept of nature in logical terms by presenting the being-other of nature as just the other of the logical Idea, including in particular then contemporary ideas of natural objects and theories of nature generally that were present in publications of the time. The criterion for the legitimacy of arguments concerning natural objects is here always the conceptual logicity that H. extracts from the “otherness of nature” in relation to “the Idea from the Idea.”

Njemacke, Ustav: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. — In: Politicka Misao. [Political Thought: Croatian Political Science Review.] Zagreb. 47 (2010), 1, 168–219.

H. submits the Constitution of the German Empire at the turn of the 18th century to a thorough critical analysis, pointing out at the beginning of the text that Germany is no longer a state. The German Constitution cannot be the foundation for German state unity because it is a conglomerate of private rights, a sanctioned separation of parts (estates) from the whole that they had secured for themselves during the preceding centuries. Such a situation was conditioned by the deficient constitutional development of Germany. Unlike most European nations, the Germans had not built a state, i.e. were neither capable of nor ready to sacrifice their particularities to the whole and discover freedom in the common free subjection to a single supreme political authority. For the most part, the text analyses particular aspects of the German Constitution – the armed forces, finance, legislation, position of the estates – and provide a comparison of the emergence and rise of the state in Germany and the rest of Europe that confirms H.s initial judgment that Germany cannot be considered a state. It is in these analyses that his idea of the state from the writings on the Constitution crystallizes. Inspired by Machiavelli – the genuinely political mind of “the highest and noblest sentiments” – to whom he dedicates almost an entire chapter – H. above all wants to see the foundation of a single body political as opposed to all existing systems of particular rights and privileges. The state is thus above all power through which a multitude actually (and not just in intention and words) defends the totality of its property. But this is only its first determination. The wider meaning of the state includes governance through general laws – which only makes a country a state – then at least minimal central financial authority, the separation of church and state, but also the participation of the people in the legislative procedure through political representation. In addition to that, a well organized state is one that limits itself to the essential functions, leaving the citizens their living freedom in everything else, for this freedom is inherently sacred. Finally, since “the concept of necessity and insight into its nature are much too weak to have an effect on action itself,” they must be justified by force; therefore, at the end of the text H. calls upon the conqueror, the modern Theseus, to unite the scattered mass of nations and mutually isolated estates into a state.

Noé, Eli: Lokalni materializem, globalni idealizem? Badiou, Hegel in vprasanje zacetka. [Lokaler Materialismus, globaler Idealismus? Badiou, Hegel und die Frage nach der Einreise.] — In: Filozofski vestnik. Ljubljana, SLO. 31 (2010), 1, 133–146.

Oliveira, Manfredo Araújo de: O sistema da Filosofia da natureza em Hegel. [Das System der Naturphilosophie bei Hegel.] — In: Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos. Recife. 7 (2010), 12, 7–31.

This paper aims to demonstrate the relevance of philosophy of nature within the Hegelian system. For this, it is first shown how Hegel's theory faces the challenge of philosophy of subjectivity, which he considers to be the major obstacle to his project of philosophy. Then we present an outline of the system proposed by Hegel, and finally his systematic conception of philosophy of nature.

Ordóñez-García, José: Amo y esclavo en Hegel: consideraciones cruzadas. [Herr und Knecht bei Hegel: sich kreuzende Überlegungen.] — In: Fragmentos de filosofía. Sevilla. 8 (2010), 87–101.

Pablo Fernández Rojas: Fenomenología de la ejecución sonora como especificidad de la dialéctica de Hegel al ser-formal de la música absoluta. [Phänomenologie des klanglichen Ausdrucks als Spezifikum der Dialektik Hegels im formalen Sein der absoluten Musik.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 311–323.

Padial Benticuaga, Juan José: Subjetividad y separación: la crítica del joven Hegel a la separación de facultades y a la soledad ontológica. [Subjektivität und Entzweiung: die Kritik des jungen Hegel an Trennung der Fähigkeiten und ontologischer Vereinzelung.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 113–128.

Padial Benticuaga, Juan José: La compleja articulación de lo sustantivo y lo subjetivo en el ser humano: de la antropología hegeliana a su antropología filosófica. [Die komplexe Artikulation des Substantiellen und Subjektiven im menschlichen Sein: von Hegels Anthropologie zu seiner philosophischen Anthropologie.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 11–22.

Padui, Raoni: The Necessity of Contingency and the Powerlessness of Nature: Hegel's two Senses of Contingency. — In: *An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Charlottesville, Va. 40 (2010), 3, 243–255.

In this paper I argue that there are two distinct senses of contingency operative within H.s philosophy, and that the failure to sufficiently distinguish between them can lead to a misrepresentation of H.s idealism. The first sense of contingency is the categorical one explicated in the *Science of Logic*, in which contingency carries the meaning of dependence and conditionality, while the second sense of contingency, predominantly found within the *Philosophy of Nature*, means irrationality and chance. Not only does H. acknowledge a systematic place for the necessity of contingency within his ontological logic, but he also admits the existence of real chance and multiplicity in nature. However, I claim that these two acknowledgements should not be collapsed since they involve different senses of contingency.

Pagano, Maurizio: La storia delle religioni e l'antropologia in Hegel. [Die Geschichte der Religionen und die Anthropologie bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benteguaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 399–411.

Pagès, Claire: Hegel ou le possible réel. La critique hégélienne des idéaux en question. — In: *PhaenEx. Revue de théorie et culture existentialistes et phénoménologiques*. 5 (2010), 1, 92–117. (www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca)

Partant de l'analyse anthropologique des âges de la vie par H. dans *l'Encyclopédie*, on présentera sa critique des idéaux. H. fustige chez le jeune homme cette tendance à opposer le réel et l'idéal. Il dégage les risques à la fois individuels et collectifs que cette vision du monde fait courir et considère „l'homme fait“ comme celui qui sait vouloir ce qui est. De cette analyse, suit la conclusion qu'il n'y a pas de possible en dehors du réel, pas de substantialité hors du monde. Autrement dit, et contre la première impression de la plupart des hommes, possible et réel, devoir être et être, s'identifient. Pourtant, si l'aversion du réel inspirée par l'attachement aux idéaux représente, selon H., un danger, le procès du devoir-être par la philosophie spéculative n'est pas non plus sans risque. Ne signe-t-il pas, comme le dira Nietzsche, la défaite de la volonté face au poids des choses? La lecture, dans la *Doctrine de l'essence*, du chapitre intitulé „L'effectivité“ dans la section du même nom, peut nous préserver de conclusions si déprimantes, car celui-ci vient expliquer, non que le possible est une chimère, une vue de l'esprit, mais qu'il s'identifie à l'effectif. Or, la reconnaissance de cette intimité produit d'une part en retour une conception plus riche, plus haute, plus noble du possible – elle lui donne en somme des lettres de noblesse – et, d'autre part, elle conduit à y lire une affirmation de la contingence. Notre argumentaire vise à établir qu'en disant que l'effectif est possible et que le possible est effectif, H. ne les détruit pas en leur ôtant leurs déterminations propres, mais leur assure une plus grande consistance. En étant possible, l'effectif cesse de se confondre avec la réalité comprise comme simple existence ou simple phénomène, comme simple il y a. En étant effectif, le possible cesse de signifier un moindre-être, un en deçà, un simplement ou seulement possible, puisqu'il est alors inscrit dans l'être, dans le monde.

Perelda, Federico: Hegel e la filosofia del tempo contemporanea. [Hegel und die Philosophie der heutigen Zeit.] — In: *verifiche*. Trento. XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 135–185.

In this essay I compare H.s theory of time and becoming with the contemporary debate, aiming on the one hand (A) at presenting H.s thought in contemporary terms, and on the other, (B) at offering new inputs to the present metaphysical debate from a H.ian point of view. From a close reading of selected H.ian texts I argue (1) that H. advocates a form of presentism and shares McTaggart's thesis that the B-series (chronological time) presupposes the A-series (dynamical time); (2) that his position is peculiar because, although he admits that change is inconsistent, he puts in jeopardy the law of non contradiction (at least in its universality), instead of denying the reality of time and change, like McTaggart did. These considerations will then lead to H.s speculative logic. According to the so called coherentistic reading of H.s thought, he never seriously questioned the principle of non contradiction: he would be just a very sophisticated Aristotelian, after all. I oppose this view, arguing (3) that H. was a proponent of an articulated form of dialetheism.

Pérez Castro, Daniel: La experiencia de la autoconciencia en Hegel. [Die Erfahrung des Selbstbewußtseins bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 319–325.

Pérez Rodríguez, Berta M.: Lo bello y la unidad del sujeto (Hegel y Adorno). [Das Schöne und die Einheit des Subjekts (Hegel und Adorno).] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento*. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 345–352.

Adorno's undeniable appreciation of H.s Aesthetics, inasmuch as they overcome the subjectivism of the 18th century, arises from his agreement with the dialectical approach: although the H.ian art has its final truth in the absolute subject, the mediated or dialectic structure of the latter entails a step forward to the recognition of the object. But this paper tries to show that Adorno's simultaneous criticism to H.s Aesthetics as a "theory of the beautiful" proves on the one hand that Adorno has uncovered the strong unity of the H.ian subject, and, on the other hand, that the Adornian dialectics themselves are incompatible with any kind of grounding unity.

Peterson, Richard T.: Violence and Historical Learning: Thinking with Robert Pippin's Hegel. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 417–435.

Pippin offers his reconstruction of H.s account of practical reason as a point of departure for contemporary social theory, yet he does not address the implications for us of H.s claim that social reflection can achieve its knowledge only on the basis of a world that has already become rational. After arguing that the unreasonableness of our world can be seen from the suffering it generates, I argue that an account of violence may be a way to retrieve the promise of H.ian insights so long as it draws in turn on existing challenges to violence and the suffering it causes. The argument discusses four kinds of violence (direct, formative, structural, and symbolic) and confronts these with a neo-H.ian conception of social learning.

Petraglia, Christina: „Il marchese-contadino“: The Divided Self and the Other in Luigi Capuana's „Il marchese di Roccaverdina“. — In: *Romance Studies*. Leeds, UK. 28 (2010), 4, 235–245.

The master–slave dialectic that illustrates a step in the process of H.ian self-consciousness, of the recognition-seeking relationship between the subject and the other provides a paradigm of social relations. H.s primeval tale finds resonance in Luigi Capuana's *Il marchese di Roccaverdina*, through the marquis's rapport with his servants, Agrippina Solmo and Rocco Criscione. Capuana's rustics may be construed as representations of the slave insofar as they become exploited objects essential for the landowner's achievement of subjectivity; however, as in the characteristic role reversal of H.s dialectic, the marquis cannot escape his sense of dependency on his others. Subsequently, the slave becomes imbued with agency, for without him the master is nothing. This study examines the power dynamic between the marquis and his servants in order to demonstrate how his socio-psychological crisis greatly depends on his interactions and relations with the principal popular characters of the novel.

Pinkard, Terry: How to Move from Romanticism to Post-Romanticism: Schelling, Hegel, and Heine. — In: *European Romantic Review*. London, UK. 21 (2010), 3, 391–407.

Kant's conception of nature's having a “purposiveness without a purpose” was quickly picked by the Romantics and made into a theory of art as revealing the otherwise hidden unity of nature and freedom. Other responses (such as H.s) turned instead to Kant's concept of judgment and used this to develop a theory that, instead of the Romantics' conception of the non-discursive manifestation of the absolute, argued for the discursively articulable realization of conceptual truths. Although H. did not argue for the “end of art” (although it is widely held that he did just that), he did, curiously enough, claim that it is art and not philosophy which tells us about the “life” of agents. To see how he reconciles that claim with his otherwise entirely discursively oriented philosophy, it is necessary to look at his thesis of the end of art's “absolute” importance. H.s worries have to do with the impossibility of fully exhibiting the “inner” in the “outer” in modern art and with the newly emerging problem of “fraudulence” in the poet's voice. This is illustrated by examples drawn from the history of music and the problems besetting the lyric poet in modern life. Because of these problems, we are, H. says, now “amphibious animals” having to live in different and seemingly incompatible worlds. H.s student, Heinrich Heine, found that the only satisfactory way of responding to this was for the modern artist to adopt a distinctive type of irony in response to the H.s worries about modern art. This form of irony, it is argued, is itself H.ian in spirit.

Pippin, Robert: Hegel on Political Philosophy and Political Actuality. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 401–417.

H. is the most prominent philosopher who argued that ‘philosophy is its own time comprehended in thought,’ and he argued for this with an elaborate theory about the necessarily historical and experiential content of normative principles and ideals, especially, in his own historical period, the ideal of a free life. His insistence that philosophy must attend to the ‘actuality’ of the norms it considers is quite controversial, often accused of accommodation with the status quo, a ‘might makes right’ theory of history, and the abandonment of philosophy's critical and reflective task. In this article, I explore H.s case for this position in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, using as a model for his argument his account of the way the intention of an action can only be properly understood as it is ‘actualized’ in an action, and I consider some of the standard objections in the light of this model.

Plotnikov, Nikolaj: The Language of the Russian Philosophical Tradition: “The History of Concepts,” as a Form of Historical and Philosophical Reflection. — In: *Social Sciences. A Quarterly Journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences*. Minneapolis/Moscow. 41 (2010), 3, 73–89.

The article focuses on the language of the Russian Philosophical Tradition. It states that the Russian language is an independent language which is distinct from the German, English or French language. The Russian philosophical tradition is stated to have had a special relationship with H. as manifested in the way his speculative idiom was perceived in Russia and how it determined for a long time the semantics of several terms in Russian Philosophy. As stated, the lack of Russian language reflects on the need to stop the use of former concepts and to find new forms of conceptualization of consciousness and cultural experience.

Pollock, Benjamin: Franz Rosenzweig’s “Oldest System-Program.” — In: *New German Critique*. Durham, NC. 111 (2010), 59–95.

When Franz Rosenzweig asserted that the two-page “system-program” in H.s handwriting that he had discovered in 1914 was in fact H.s copy of a text composed by F. W. J. Schelling, he sparked a scholarly controversy over the origins of German idealism that continues to this day. The present article claims that the overarching philosophical goal of Rosenzweig’s essay is to revive the conception of philosophy’s task that H. and Schelling shared and that Rosenzweig understood to have been obscured in his own time: the task of system. By examining how Rosenzweig understood the philosophical trends of his own day; by uncovering the meaning of the task of system, which Rosenzweig understood to have been set forth for the first time in the “system-program;” and by attending especially to the title Rosenzweig gave to the two-page manuscript, I explore the impact that such a discovery of the “oldest” expression of the task of system was meant to have for Rosenzweig’s own time – and for the author of *The Star of Redemption* himself.

Polo, Leonardo: La unidad en Hegel. [Die Einheit bei Hegel.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 147–164.

Purtschert, Patricia: On the limit of spirit: Hegel’s racism revisited. — In: *Philosophy & Social Criticism*. London, UK. 36 (2010), 9, 1039–1051.

In his speech at the University of Dakar in July 2007, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy referred to Africa as the continent that has not yet fully entered history. This article takes this obvious reference to H. as its starting point and examines the current significance of ‘H.s Africa.’ Through a close reading of *The Philosophy of History* and *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, it shows that H.s remarks on Africa are by no means incidental. They constitute reminders of a modernity that is based on the construction of Africa as its own limit. The return of H.s Africa, the article concludes, can thus not be restricted to a problem of the new European right. It is part of an understanding of modernity that remains haunted by the specters of racism.

Rand, Sebastian: Subjetividade animal e o sistema nervoso na „Filosofia da Natureza“ de Hegel. [Animalische Subjektivität und das Nervensystem in Hegels Naturphilosophie.] — In: Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos. [Elektronische Zeitschrift Hegel-Studien.] Recife. 7 (2010), 12, 32–51.

H.s idealism is often thought to entail, or at least include, a rejection of the idea that our natural existence could be determinative of our spiritual or minded existence. But while for H. our mindedness must be distinguished from our strictly natural being, we can nonetheless know nature, including our natural selves, as the very basis and source of that mindedness. In this paper, I argue that H.s discussion of nervous system physiology in higher-order animals describes such animals as manifesting a proto-self-consciousness through their nervous system activity and its role in their overall bodily functioning. While this proto-self-consciousness does not on its own underwrite the possibility of genuine mindedness in humans, it constitutes an important part of H.s larger argument for the emergence of non-natural mindedness out of nature, and of his ultimate argument for the reconciliation of nature and “Geist.”

Rand, Sebastian: Stimulus-Response Relations and Organic Unity in Hegel and Schelling. — In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism. Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science. Berlin/Boston. VIII (2010), 185–206.

H. und Schelling sind gleichermaßen dafür bekannt, naturphilosophische Programme verfolgt zu haben, die die von Kant in seiner dritten Kritik formulierten Restriktionen der teleologischen Urteilskraft verabschieden. Doch während Schellings Naturphilosophie durch den konsistenten Gebrauch von analogisierenden Überlegungen sowie von Erklärungen charakterisiert werden kann, die auf der Annahme von Kräften beruhen, erhält H.s Naturphilosophie ihren spezifischen Charakter durch die Zurückweisung solcher Erklärungen sowie durch seine Kritik des Kantischen Ursache-Wirkungs-Verhältnisses. Dieser Unterschied ihrer Ansätze kann deutlich an ihren unterschiedlichen Darstellungen der Beziehung zwischen dem Lebewesen und seiner Umwelt erkannt werden – Darstellungen, die sie jeweils in Auseinandersetzung mit demjenigen formulierten, was sie für die zeitgenössische Physiologie hielten. Auf der Grundlage einer Interpretation dieser Darstellungen argumentiere ich dafür, daß es H. gelang, eine philosophische Betrachtungsweise des Organismus zu entwickeln, die einerseits frei von zweifelhaften metaphysischen Implikationen war, und die andererseits dazu in der Lage war zu zeigen, daß die sich selbst determinierende und sich selbst reproduzierende Einheit lebender Wesen ganz und gar vereinbar ist mit den mechanischen und chemischen Substanzen und Beziehungen der unorganischen Natur, wenn sie auch auf diese nicht reduzierbar ist.

Redondo, Manuel Jiménez: Palabra, tiempo y concepto en el pensamiento de Hegel. [Wort, Zeit und Begriff in Hegels Denken.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 129–153.

Reschke, Renate: Der Weltgeist „in zischelndem Schwäbisch“. Hegel an der Berliner Universität. Zum 200 Gründungstag der Alma Mater. — In: Humboldt-Spektrum. Berlin. 17 (2010), 1–2, 92–98.

H.s Berufung nach Berlin war der Höhepunkt seiner akademischen Karriere. Er fand in Preußens Hauptstadt Bildungsreformen, aufstrebende Wissenschaften, politische Restauration, Klassizismus und Moderne, Bürgerlichkeit, Realitätssinn, Philosophenzwist, studentische Aufgeschlossenheit: In der großstädtischen Atmosphäre sah er einen Ort für seinen ‚Weltgeist‘. Nicht ohne Ironie, die der Notwendigkeit einer allgewaltigen Vernunft abgetrotzt war, und nicht ohne Melancholie, weil für die Zukunft nur noch Hoffnung zu formulieren war. Die Augen der berühmten Eule sahen zwar scharf die Realität, vermochten aber nicht, mehr in der Dämmerung zu erblicken.

Restrepo, Carlos Enrique: La frase de Hegel: „Dios ha muerto“. [Hegels Satz „Gott ist tot“.] — In: Escritos. Medellín, CO. 18 (2010), 41, 427–452.

Rodríguez Blanco, Cristina: Autoconocimiento hegeliano u origen poliano? [Hegelsche Selbsterkenntnis oder Poloscher Ursprung?] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 413–417.

Rojas Jiménez, Alejandro: La imaginación en la filosofía de Hegel. [Die Einbildungskraft in der Philosophie Hegels.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 275–283.

Román, Javier Orlando Aguirre: Hacia una concepción hegeliana de la dignidad humana: primer paso, la superación del dualismo natural vs. social. [Zu einer Hegelschen Auffassung von Menschenwürde: erster Schritt, die Überwindung des Dualismus natürlich vs. sozial.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 391–397.

Ruiz Sanjuán, César: Convergencias y divergencias entre las concepciones metodológicas de Hegel y Marx. [Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen den methodologischen Konzeptionen von Hegel und Marx.] Revista de filosofía. Madrid. 35 (2010), 1, 89–110.

This paper analyzes the shared elements and the main differences of the conceptions of H. and Marx regarding the method. First we establish the theoretical frame of the relation between both thinkers and show the problems that this relation presents. Later we carry out a critique of the interpretation of H.ian Marxism. Finally we give a general characterization of which we consider that they make up the place of confluence of the conceptions of H. and Marx.

Ruiz Sanjuán, César: La crítica antropológica al idealismo hegeliano. [Die anthropologische Kritik des Hegelschen Idealismus.] — In: *Δαίμων*. Revista de Filosofía. Murcia. 51 (2010), 209–228.

Rush, Fred: Hegel, Humor, and the Ends of Art. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Special Issue on Hegel and Literature*. London, UK. 62 (2010), 1–22.

H.'s philosophy of art can be a significant resource for understanding some of the main developments in art and in the philosophy of art of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The increase in self-conscious artistic focus on artistic media, the stability of genre categories, and the importance of historical understanding for artistic understanding are all important inheritances from H. When one turns from these quite general features of H.'s aesthetics to the specifics of his analysis of modern art that approaches the "end of art" as he viewed it, the question of continuing significance is considerably more difficult. Against the grain of some recent scholarship, I argue that H.'s account of the end stages of what he called Romantic Art is retrograde and not a worthwhile conceptual resource for understanding much modern art.

Salmerón, Miguel: Lo feo en general y lo feo en Hegel y Rosenkranz. [Das Häßliche im allgemeinen und das Häßliche bei Hegel und Rosenkranz.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiel Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 2, 353–360.

Sánchez Fernández, José Manuel: Lógica, dialéctica y reflexión en el pensamiento hegeliano del periodo de Jena. [Logik, Dialektik und Reflexion im Hegelschen Denken der Jenaer Periode.] — In: *Logos. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica*. Madrid. 43 (2010), 287–307.

Sandis, Constantine: The Man Who Mistook his "Handlung" for a "Tat": Hegel on Oedipus and Other Tragic Agents. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Special Issue on Hegel and Literature*. London, UK. 62 (2010), 35–60.

Throughout his work H. distinguishes between the notion of an act ("Tun") from the standpoint of the agent (behaviour in so far as it relates to one's own foreknowledge, purpose, intention, and knowledge) and that of all other standpoints (e.g. legal, scientific, cultural, etc.). He terms the former "Handlung" (action) and the latter "Tat" (deed). This distinction should not be confused with the contemporary one between action and mere bodily movement. For one, both "Handlung" and "Tat" are aspects of conduct that results from the will, viz. Tun. Moreover, H. taxonomy is motivated purely by concerns relating to modes of perception. So, whereas theorists such as Donald Davidson assert that all actions are events that are intentional under some description, H. reserves the term 'action' for those aspects of behaviour that are highlighted by a specific (albeit contested) set of agent-related descriptions. This is not an ontological category, since there are no such objects as actions-under-specific-descriptions. Sophocles' Theban Trilogy reveals the central role that these notions must play in any H.ian understanding of tragic drama. Indeed the contrasts that matter most to H.'s general take on both epic and tragic poetry are more closely related to the study of action than the standard theory attributed to H. would seem to allow. It is more fruitful, then, to

incorporate H.s insights into such tragedies to the model of action employed by him than it is to try to make them fit whatever 'theory' of tragedy might appear to be hinted at in his Aesthetics. H. perceives more clearly than any other philosopher of his time that ethics without action theory is blind, just as action theory without ethics is empty. In this, as I shall try to show, he anticipates the work of Prichard, Ross, Anscombe, and Davidson.

Sandkaulen, Birgit: „Bilder‘ sind“. Zur Ontologie des Bildes im Diskurs um 1800. — In: Johannes Grave/Arno Schubbach (Hgg.): Denken mit dem Bild. Philosophische Einsätze des Bildbegriffs von Platon bis Hegel. München 2010. 131–151. (eikones. Herausgegeben vom Nationalen Forschungsschwerpunkt Bildkritik an der Universität Basel)

Sanguinetti, Federico: Buscando las raíces de la Antropología: contribución para una reconstrucción de la génesis de la Antropología en el período jenenense de Hegel. [Auf der Suche nach den Wurzeln der Anthropologie: Beitrag zu einer Rekonstruktion der Genese der Anthropologie in Hegels Jenaer Periode.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiel Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 235–242.

Sans, Georg: Gerold Prauss über Moral und Recht im Staat nach Kant und Hegel. — In: Theologie und Philosophie. Freiburg i. Brsg./Basel/Wien. 85 (2010), 2, 185–203.

Die Selbstzweckformel des kategorischen Imperativs gebietet, einen Menschen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel zu gebrauchen. Gerold Prauss zufolge hätte Kant genauer zwischen ‚nicht bloß als Mittel, sondern zugleich als Zweck‘ und ‚gar nicht als Mittel, sondern nur als Zweck‘ unterscheiden sollen. Die erste Formel beschreibe ein Rechtsverhältnis zwischen zwei sich gegenseitig anerkennenden selbstbestimmten Subjekten; die zweite Formel hingegen beziehe sich auf Situationen, in denen mir ein auf Hilfe angewiesenes vernünftiges Wesen gegenübertritt. Lediglich in dem zweiten Fall verdiene die sittliche Pflicht moralisch genannt zu werden. Die Abhandlung zeichnet Prauss' Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Recht und Moral sowie zur Rolle des säkularen Staats bei deren Verwirklichung nach und bewertet sie als überaus anregenden Versuch, der Kantischen These von der für sich selbst praktischen Vernunft einen systematischen Sinn zu verleihen.

Santilli, Oscar E.: Hegel y Gadamer: distancia y proximidad entre dialéctica y hermenéutica. [Hegel und Gadamer: Distanz und Nähe zwischen Dialektik und Hermeneutik.] — In: Endoxa: Series Filosóficas. Madrid. 26 (2010), 87–106.

Santos Herceg, José G.: Huellas de Hegel en el Pensamiento latinoamericano: Sobre la concepción de Filosofía. [Hegels Spuren im Lateinamerikanischen Denken: Zur Konzeption der Philosophie.] — In: Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico, Madrid. 15 (2010), 43–62.

Schatzki, Theodore R.: Pippin's Hegel on Action. — In: *Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Leiden. 53 (2010), 5, 490–506.

This essay is a commentary on and critique of the conception of human activity that Robert Pippin attributes to H. in his recent book, *Hegel's Practical Philosophy*. Two principal features of this conception are that it treats human activity as indeterminate and that it construes what someone does and why on a given occasion as depending on social contexts. Pippin suggests that these two features will sound strange to contemporary philosophers. The essay claims, by contrast, that these features will not sound strange to philosophers who advocate one of a small family of other accounts that espouse these two ideas. The essay argues, further, that certain such accounts, namely, ones inspired by Heidegger and Wittgenstein, are more promising accounts of human activity than is H.s. The bulk of the essay explores the indeterminacy of activity and the dependency of activity on social context as these are analyzed in Pippin's book and in Heidegger and Wittgenstein.

Schmidt, Stephan: Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity. — In: *Philosophy East and West*. Honolulu, Hawaii. 61 (2011), 2, 260–302.

This essay discusses the New Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan (1909–1995), who in a number of highly influential writings in the 1970s attempted a kind of Confucian *Aufhebung* of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy. Section 1 analyzes Mou's hybrid terminology and demonstrates how his use of Kantian concepts such as intellectual intuition (*zhi de zhijue*) and autonomy (*zi Lu*) significantly altered the meaning of these terms without making the differences explicit. By relating this particular brand of Kantian Confucianism to the Chinese discourse on modernization in which New Confucians took a stand against May Fourth iconoclasm. Section 2 brings to light the inner strategic logic of Mou Zongsan's approach, namely a two-step argument for both the possibility and the necessity of Confucian Modernity. The concluding 3rd section traces Mou's strategic appropriation of Kantian philosophy to his brief but momentous encounter with H.s metaphysics of history in the 1950s. Although Mou Zongsan himself never fully acknowledged his indebtedness to H., the essay demonstrates that it was H. who first provided Mou with an understanding of how to enlist Kant's services in his quest for Confucian Modernity.

Scholz, Leander: Freiheit, Gleichheit, Sinnlichkeit – Jacques Rancière, Hegel und die holländische Malerei. — In: *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*. Hamburg. 55 (2010), 2, 187–200.

This article argues that the foundation of political theory in aesthetics by Jacques Rancière can be seen as an actualization of the slogan of fraternalism during the French Revolution. This actualization of fraternalism as "aesthetic community" gives Rancière the possibility to operate with the Marxian concept of classes without positively defining the experience of community. Because Rancière understands democracy as the chance for political intervention, the concept of an "aesthetic community" (as opposed to the traditional concept of classes) allows him to posit an endless process of political subjectification. To sharpen this argument, the article compares Rancière's understanding of democracy to Jacques Derrida's, who also focuses on a democratic struggle beyond democratic rules, but is very skeptical about the slogan of fraternalism.

Serra, Teresa: Hegel e il nostro tempo: riflessioni sulla mala infinità. [Hegel und unsere Zeit: Reflexionen über die schlechte Unendlichkeit.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga.* 15 (2010), 2, 431–437.

da Silva, Márcia Zebina Araújo: Teleologia circular: a centralidade da vida em Hegel. [Zirkuläre Teleologie: der Mittelpunkt des Lebens bei Hegel.] — In: *Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos. Recife.* 7 (2010), 12, 52–75.

In order to point out that life, as an inner purpose, serves as a model for structuring a system, we propose to clarify the distinction between external and internal teleology, and to indicate that the internal *telos*, which characterizes logic life and living organisms, appears as a return to oneself. Thus, there is a non-linear, circular motion, present in the whole of living nature.

Soresi, Sergio: Normatività, spirito, libertà. A partire da Hegel. [Normativität, Geist, Freiheit. Ausgehend von Hegel.] — In: *verifiche. Trento.* XXXIX (2010), 1–4, 187–213.

The starting point of this paper is the conviction that normativity is a notion through which we can fruitfully interrogate H.s thought from the background of questions of the contemporary debate on naturalism. The thesis I want to argue for is that a material normativity can be found in H.s philosophy. This normativity is not reducible to intra-mental relations, such as inferential or semantic relationships, or relations between an abstract concept or model and his object. In H.s philosophy there is an ontological side of normativity that provides an anchor in the world to the activity of thought. In H.s perspective, there is a material link between the normativity of thought and objective world. This link highlights the difference between H.s way of considering thinking activity and the formalistic conception of thought. H. conceives of thought as an activity that regulates and determines itself by itself in thinking the otherness of the object that is responding to its normative demands. This self-determining and self-regulating capacity of thought is its freedom. Therefore, if it is possible to acknowledge a social ground of reason and normativity, this self-regulating and self-determining capacity of thought in responding to the normative demands of the world can be seen as H.s strategy to solve the problem of cultural and social relativism of the conceptual schemes.

Speight, Allen: Hegel and Lukács on the Novel. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. Special Issue on Hegel and Literature. London, UK.* 62 (2010), 23–34.

H. was clearly an important influence behind Georg Lukács' *Theory of the Novel*, but the relation between the two thinkers' views of the novel has been a matter of some dispute. This article compares and examines H. and Lukács' views of the novel as they are embedded within their theoretical views of genre, looking successively at their accounts of epic, drama and Romantic literature. While their two theories share much in terms of their appeal to notions of epic totality, objectivity and the provision of a notion of home, they differ in their treatments of epic and tragic collision, bardic and heroic individuality, and in their assessments of the possibility of modern epic and tragedy. In a concluding section, the article further examines two issues that raise specific questions for both theories: (1) their theoretical openness to change (including, for example, the openness of their respective theories to the role that women play as authors, readers and subject matter in the development of the early novel), and (2) the nature of the narrative philosophical genre in which both H. and Lukács self-reflectively worked.

Speight, Allen: Hegel on Narrativity and Agency. — In: Laitinen, Arto/Sandis, Constantine (Eds.): *Hegel on Action*. New York 2010. 232–243.

This article discusses the relation between narrative and agency in H. and in contemporary philosophical discussion (among such diverse figures as Noël Carroll, Galen Strawson, David Velleman and Peter Goldie), arguing for ways in which a specifically H.ian notion of narrative agency might add to the ongoing debate. It argues in particular that a narrative account of agency of the sort that H. articulates is important for an understanding of agency that involves commitments to the retrospective, socially inflected, and implicitly holistic nature of the task of ethical reasons-giving.

Stewart, Jon: Hegel, Kierkegaard and the Danish Debate about Mediation. — In: *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain*. London, UK. 61 (2010), 61–85.

H.'s controversial conception of logic was revolutionary since it attacked the basic principles of Aristotelian logic that stood as the foundation for the field for well over a millennium. H.'s logic was the first theory since ancient times to seriously call into question the laws of contradiction, excluded middle and identity, which were long regarded as the most basic laws of reasoning. He replaced these laws of logic with the principle of mediation. Søren Kierkegaard has traditionally been regarded as one of the most radical critics of H. and his speculative logic. However, despite Kierkegaard's often polemical rhetoric, the two thinkers in fact have much in common on precisely the question of mediation. Although Kierkegaard clearly wants to reject some aspects of H.'s position, nonetheless there are many indications that he does not reject the principle of mediation as such but rather uses and incorporates it into his own theories.

Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin: Über die Seele bei Platon, Aristoteles und Hegel. — In: Crone, Katja/Schnepf, Robert/Stolzenberg, Jürgen (Hgg.): *Über die Seele*. Frankfurt a. M. 2010. 210–230.

H.'s Analyse der Seele folgt praktisch in allen Details derjenigen des Aristoteles, wobei aber Platons Sorge um die Seele und ihre guten Eigenschaften als Währmacher für irgendwelche Aussagen über die Person auch noch nach ihrem Ableben aus dem Fokus verschwindet.

Timmermans, Benoît: La conscience heureuse dans la phenomenology de l'esprit et son rayonnement dans l'œuvre de Hegel: rire, comédie, félicité. — In: *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. Louvain. 108 (2010), 1, 31–53.

What is at stake in the moment of the happy consciousness as it is developed in the margins of the chapters of the *Phenomenology of the Spirit* on aesthetic religion and manifest religion? Various interpretations are considered, which clarify notably the distinction between the notions of contrast (*Kontrast*) and of contradiction (*Widerspruch*), the role of the comic in H.'s philosophy, the importance of Blessedness (*Seligkeit*) and of happiness (*Glückseligkeit*).

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: L'héritage hégélien aujourd'hui. — In: *Revue philosophique de France et de l'étranger*. Paris. 135 (2010), 2, 223–234.

Quatre recueils récents comportant des contributions de philosophes allemands et américains permettent de préciser et discuter les grandes questions soulevées aujourd'hui par diverses traditions de lecture de H., en particulier, la question d'une lecture morale de la „reconnaissance“ dans la *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, la théorie de la connaissance, le statut de la beauté.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Sufrimiento de Dios y ausencia de Dios en el pensamiento de Hegel de 1802 a 1807. [Leiden Gottes und Abwesenheit Gottes im Denken Hegels von 1802 bis 1807.] — In: Escritos. Medellín, CO. 18 (2010), 41, 453–477.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Le théologie-politique chez Hegel. — In: Jean-François Rey (sous la direction de): Visages de la Justice. Lille 2010. 171–182.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Le tournant social dans l'interprétation de la „Phénoménologie de l'esprit“. — In: Alexandra Roux (sous la direction de): Schelling en 1809. Paris 2010. 315–325. (Recherches sur l'idéalisme et le romantisme allemands. 5)

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: L'héritage hégélien aujourd'hui. Revue critique. — In: Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'étranger. Paris. 2 (2010), 223–234.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Philosophie et religion révélée chez Hegel. — In: Jean-Christophe Bardout/Philippe Capelle (Éd.): Philosophie et théologie à l'époque moderne. Paris 2010. 387–399. (Anthologie. Tome III)

Vujeva, Domagoj: Bilješka uz Hegelov „Ustav Njemačke“. [Anmerkungen zu Hegels Verfassungsschrift.] — In: Politicka Misao. [Political Thought: Croatian Political Science Review.] Zagreb. 47 (2010), 1, 163–167.

The author describes the stages of creation of fragments of which the text on constitution is composed, and points to the historical events which directly influenced H.s work on the text. He further clarifies the criteria of selection of fragments for the Croatian translation and the manner in which they have been connected, i.e. in which the text has been organized. Finally, the author sets forth the characteristics of the Croatian translation.

Wandschneider, Dieter: Formas elementares do psíquico. Um esboço teórico-sistemático a partir da interpretação hegeliana do organismo. [Elementare Formen des Psychischen. Eine systematisch-theoretische Gliederung der Hegelschen Interpretation des Körpers.] — In: Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos. [Elektronische Zeitschrift Hegel-Studien.] Recife. 7 (2010), 12, 52–75.

The organism, self-preserving its species-universality, has, in H.s interpretation, the character of an Acting universal, i.e. of a *subject*, of a *self*, which thus already inheres the plant. For the animal, so H., beyond that a *double self* is characteristic. This structure is system-theoretically re-interpreted as auto-regulation in the sense that the organismic process is controlled by the *set-points of the system existence itself* and in this sense by a *self-instance*, which regulates the biochemical functions of the plant, and, for the animal, additionally the movement actions. The latter presuppose perception and thus sensual organization and a nervous system. The entanglement of external perception and self perception is, referring to H.s interpretation, determined as *feeling*, by which an *inner dimension* is

spanned, characterized, amongst others, by privacy and quale-predicates. A behavior adapted flexibly to the situation and thus potentially 'intelligent', as is shown further, is only possible as feeling-controlled, not as robot or reflex behavior. The Psychic is thus not a superfluous *epiphenomenon* of the Organic, but possesses real biological relevance. Reinterpreted in a system theoretical vein the Psychic thereby is determined as an *emergence phenomenon* of a material, self-preserving system qualified for perception and – following H. – exhibiting the self-self structure of the animal subjectivity. Soul and self-preservation indeed essentially belong together – an insight, which might be substantial also for the project of artificial intelligence. Essential for the emergentistic interpretation is that it is possible only on the ground of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature providing a sustainable ontological basis for the empirical-system theoretical argumentation.

Watkins, Eric: Kraft und Gesetz: Hegels Kant-Kritik im Kapitel „Kraft und Verstand“ der *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. — In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/ International Yearbook of German Idealism. Philosophie und Wissenschaft/Philosophy and Science. Berlin/Boston. VIII (2010), 228–250.

In this paper I present an interpretation of H.'s notoriously obscure "Kraft und Verstand" chapter from the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* that describes its basic structure: the various models of consciousness – those of force and law – and the different problems that consciousness experiences with each. The interpretation displays three distinctive features. First, it provides a clear illustration of these complex models and the problems each one encounters with examples from Newtonian mechanics. Second, it provides a plausible explanation of how H. thought that a fundamental "Verkehrung" of the world takes place within consciousness, an explanation that has long remained an unfulfilled desideratum in H. scholarship. Third, it is able to show how H.'s position could plausibly be viewed as presenting a criticism of Kant's theoretical philosophy (his philosophy of science in particular), which makes possible an independent evaluation of whether H.'s objection hits its mark.

Watts, Daniel: Subjective Thinking: Kierkegaard on Hegel's Socrates. — In: Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. London, UK. 61 (2010), 23–44.

This essay considers the critical response to H.'s view of Socrates we find in Kierkegaard's dissertation, *The Concept of Irony*. I argue that this dispute turns on the question whether or not the examination of particular thinkers enters into Socrates' most basic aims and interests. I go on to show how Kierkegaard's account, which relies on an affirmative answer to this question, enables him to provide a cogent defence of Socrates' philosophical practice against H.'s criticisms.

Westphal, Kenneth R.: From 'Convention' to 'Ethical Life:' Hume's Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective. — In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. Leiden. 7 (2010), 1, 105–132.

Hume and contemporary Humans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticized by appeal to Hume's theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone's sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume's theory of justice shows how the principles of justice are artificial without being arbitrary. In this regard, Hume's theory belongs to the unjustly neglected modern natural law tradition. Some key merits of this strand in Hume's theory are explicated by linking it to Kant's constructivist method of identifying and

justifying practical principles (à la O'Neill), and by showing how and why H. adopted and further developed Kant's constructivism by re-integrating it with Hume's central natural law concern with our actual social practices.

Woodward, William R.: Hermann Lotze's Gestalt Metaphysics in Light of the Schelling and Hegel Renaissance (1838–1841). — In: *Idealistic Studies. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*. Charlottesville, Va. 40 (2010), 1–2, 163–188.

Situating Lotze in the School of Speculative Theology, I use debates about Schelling's critique of H. — then and now — to understand Lotze's critique of H. Lotze's early metaphysics seems to employ a version of H.s dialectical analysis of being, phenomena, and mind emphasizing “the interconnection of things.” One can equally argue that he proceeds in an analytic style of reviewing and testing alternative theories. My tentative conclusion is that he assumes the existence of reality (the Absolute) like Schelling, and makes cognition a process subordinate to that reality. In this respect, he goes beyond his Kantian mentors J. F. Fries and E. F. Apelt. From all these sources came a radically original *Gestalt* metaphysics. For example, he reverses Kant's forms of intuition (*Anschauung*) into “forms of intuit ability” (*Anschaulichkeit*), including the relational categories of space, time, motion, mechanism, organism, law, and event. He then makes the categories into ethical levels of a “teleological idealism.” In this way he overcomes his Herbartian teachers' separation of metaphysics from ethics, evincing his center H.ian roots.

Xolocotzi Yáñez, Angel: Aparecer y mostrarse: Notas en torno a la fenomenología en Hegel y Heidegger. [Erscheinen und Sichzeigen: Notizen zur Phänomenologie bei Hegel und Heidegger.] — In: *Eidos: Revista de Filosofía*. Madrid. 12 (2010), 10–27.

Yeomans, Christopher: “Acting on” instead of “stepping back:” Hegel's conception of the relation between motivations and the free will. — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padiá Benticuaga (coord. por): *Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel*. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 377–387.

One of the most difficult problems in H.s moral psychology is trying to understand the relation between motivations and the rational will on H.s account. Rather following Kant in seeing free will as stepping back from natural desires to reach a purely rational perspective, H. holds that rationality is internal to desiring, a way of desiring well. Motivations have a rational form when we are able to flexibly navigate within their field of possible objects, means, and forms of significance. This is why H. claims that the free agent experiences their drives as the rational system of the will itself.

Yeomans, Christopher: Hegel and Analytic Philosophy of Action. — In: *The Owl of Minerva. Journal of the Hegel Society of America*. Chicago, IL. 42, (2010), 1–2, 41–62.

A primary fault line in the analytic philosophy of action is the debate between causal/Davidsonian and interpretivist/Anscombian theories of action. The fundamental problem of the former is producing a criterion for distinguishing intentional from non-intentional causal chains; the fundamental problem of the latter is producing an account of the relation between reasons and actions that is represented by the ‘because’ in the claim that the agent acted because she had the reason. It is argued that H.s conception of teleology can be used to develop the interpretivist position by solving both its and the causal theory's fundamental problems.

Zabaleta Imaz, Josu: Dinero como lo singular universal: una lectura del concepto de dinero en Marx desde la Categoría de la Medida de Hegel. [Geld als das einzelne Allgemeine: eine Lektüre des Begriffs des Geldes bei Marx anhand der Kategorie des Maaßes bei Hegel.] — In: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía. Madrid. 5 (2010), 17–30.

Zambrana, Rocío: Hegel's Hyperbolic Formalism. — In: Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain. London, UK. 61 (2010), 107–132.

Through a reading of H.s notion of absolute method, this paper develops the crucial insight of the theory of determinacy laid out in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*: the inseparability of form and content. The syllogism of method collapses the distinction between form and content, marking the achievement of H.s absolute idealism. The meaning of this collapse is neither the sheer positivity of the concept nor the sovereignty of reason, but rather the negativity of form and the necessity of content that follows from such negativity. Negation requires content in order to be negation, to negate what is a fixed determinacy; the positive that results from negation is an alternative determination. H.s insistence on showing the inseparability of form and content formally is what I call his hyperbolic formalism. The paper also assesses the normative function of method via an engagement with Angelica Nuzzo's work. While Nuzzo reads method as providing a norm for a philosophical thinking of the real sciences, I argue that method makes explicit the inseparability of form and content, which constrains the normative function of a philosophical thinking of nature and spirit.

de Zan, Julio: La lucha por el reconocimiento en Hegel: ¿acontecimiento moral, o antropológico? discusión de algunas interpretaciones recientes. [Der Kampf um Anerkennung bei Hegel: moralisches oder anthropologisches Ereignis? Diskussion einiger neuer Interpretationen.] — In: Ignacio Falgueras Salinas/Juan A. García-González/Juan José Padial Benticuaga (coord. por): Yo y Tiempo. La antropología de G. W. F. Hegel. Contrastes. Suplemento. Málaga. 15 (2010), 1, 307–318.

NACHTRÄGE ZUM BERICHTSZEITRAUM 2009

Arrese Igor, Hector Oscar: La crítica de Hegel a la teoría fichteana de la soberanía popular. [Hegels Kritik an der Fichteschen Theorie der Volkssouveranität.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 307–329.

In this paper I focus on the theory of the popular sovereignty and the ephorate expounded by Fichte in his *Foundations of Natural Right* of 1796/97. In the first place, I expound the foundation of the principle of right and of the state, in order to understand the necessity of the popular control of the government. Finally I reconstruct and evaluate H.'s critic of Fichte's theory in his writing of 1802 about the natural right.

Augusto, Roberto. La evolución intelectual del último schelling: filosofía negativa y filosofía positiva. [Die geistige Entwicklung des späten Schelling: negative Philosophie und positive Philosophie.] — In: Anuario Filosófico. Pamplona. 42 (2009), 3, 577–600.

The aim of this article is to examine Schelling's intellectual development, which ultimately led him to establish the difference between negative philosophy and positive philosophy, a central theme in the later stages of development of his philosophical thought. We first carry out a critical analysis of the idealism found in Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift*, later turning our attention to the Erlangen lectures. The study continues with an examination of Schelling's criticism of H. and the identification of H.ianism as negative philosophy. Finally, we analyse the dichotomy between negative and positive philosophy.

Bell, Avril: A Conversation through History: Towards Postcolonial Coexistence. — In: Journal of Intercultural Studies. London [u.a.]. 30 (2009), 2, 173–191.

This paper takes the form of a three-part exploration of the uses and limitations of the H.ian Master-Slave for the analysis of colonial and post-colonizing subjectivities in Aotearoa New Zealand. In H., the subjectivities of Master and Slave are socially constituted via a struggle for recognition that one 'wins' and the other 'lose.' Subsequently their relations are mediated through Things. The first part of this paper demonstrates how struggles over colonial history (here the H.ian Thing) constitute 'Pakeha' and 'Maori' as Master and Slave. This is not the end of H.'s difficult story however. The second section explores the resulting dissatisfactions of the colonizing subject and the possibilities for autonomy of the colonized. Finally, I outline the ultimate limitations of the H.ian framework, identifying a number of significant ways in which 'Pakeha,' 'Maori' and 'History' all escape the confines of the Master-Slave-Thing triad, suggesting possibilities for a reconceived postcolonial relationship.

Bernasconi, Robert: Must We Avoid Speaking of Religion? The Truths of Religions. — In: Research in Phenomenology. Leiden. 39 (2009), 2, 204–223.

Heidegger already recognized in the 1920s the difficulties facing a phenomenology of religion, but the problems are greatly multiplied once one recognizes that many of the so-called religions were constituted as such only in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and that the "invention" of these religions was according to an idea of religion shaped by Christianity. By investigating the incompatible attempts of Kant and H. to negotiate that idea, I identify the genealogy of the

double bind whereby today it appears that one is faced with a choice between two violence's: the violence of imposing the word religion on practices that do not readily follow the model of the Christian religion and the violence of refusing the word to non-Christian religions.

De Boer, Karin: Kant, Hegel, en het begrip 'immanente kritiek' in de moderne filosofie. [Kant, Hegel und der Begriff 'immanente Kritik' in der modernen Philosophie.] — In: Tijdschrift voor filosofie. Leuven. 71 (2009), 3, 475–499.

Throughout the twentieth century, critical philosophy has proceeded by confronting a particular position by a criterion that it considered to be contained within itself. This method has been extremely productive. I argue, however, that it relies on a tension between particularity and universality the implications of which have not been sufficiently acknowledged. In order to expose this tension I go back to the roots of this method in modern philosophy, that is, to Kant's first *Critique* and H.'s essay entitled *On the Essence of Philosophical Critique as Such and its Relation to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular* (1802). The fact that Kant and H. drew most divergent criteria from what they considered to be pure reason seems to compromise not merely their universality, but also their alleged immanence in the philosophical systems under critique. Even though the method initiated by Kant and H. is haunted by the tension between particularity and universality, I do not wish to suggest that the idea of immanent critique should be abandoned altogether. Contemporary critical philosophy should rather affirm that paradigms tend to conceive of their own particular principles as universal, and by that very gesture – the essence of ideology – tend to oppose themselves to contrary paradigms.

Bonacina, Giovanni: Note e discussioni – Hegel storico della filosofia in una nuova traduzione italiana. [Bemerkungen und Diskussionen – Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie in einer neuen italienischen Übersetzung.] — In: Rivista di storia della filosofia. Milano. 4 (2009), 791–799.

Brauer, Daniel: La contradicción de la razón consigo misma. Reflexiones en torno a la concepción de la locura en la antropología de Hegel. [Der Widerspruch der Vernunft mit sich selbst. Reflexionen über die Konzeption des Wahnsinns in der Hegels Anthropologie.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. Birmingham. 35 (2009), 2, 287–305.

The radical distinction between reason and madness that according to Foucault, would characterize the philosophy of the Enlightenment, cannot be found in H.'s conception, for whom madness is a "privilege" of a rational being. More than that, madness represents for him on the one hand, a "necessary" stage in the formation of the human mind and on the other hand, it reveals essential aspects of normal consciousness. In this article I deal mainly with the relation between madness and consciousness. For H. madness is not synonymous of irrationality but an unsolved conflict of reason with itself.

Brincat, Shannon: Negativity and Open-Endedness in the Dialectic of World Politics. — In: *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. Thousand Oaks, CA. 34 (2009), 4, 455–493.

This article illustrates the importance of negativity within the dialectical method, aiming to bring clarity to what has been rendered unnecessarily mystical within recent revisions of dialectics, particular in the conception of "meta-dialectics." The negative element in dialectics, where in the

movement of sublation the subject remains undetermined and no identical, is argued to be the productive moment in the dialectical movement that leads to open-ended and ongoing processes of change. The article argues that considerable conceptual difficulties arise if one attempts to counterpose negative dialectics to positive dialectics and particularly in interpretations of H.'s *Logic* and Adorno's *Negative Dialectics* that attempt to do so. The two moments of positivity and negativity are shown to be mutually related. If conceived in this manner, dialectical analysis can provide radical insights into processes of social change in world politics that are, and remain, open ended.

Carrasco, Nemrod: Ciudadanía global versus estado-nación: la inversión de Hegel. [Globale Bürgerschaft vs. Staatsnation: Hegels Umkehrung.] — In: *Astrolabio. Revista Internacional de Filosofía*. Barcelona. 9 (2009), 35–42.

The idea of European Citizenship is something more than the old pre-modern idea: independently of your particular identity, the universal dimension can always be participated directly. The paradox is that today, when people speak precisely about global citizenship, this legacy is in danger. At present, the demand of a universal community coexists with the defense of particular identities threatened by the global dynamic of the capital. We will examine how the relationship between cosmopolitan identity and national identity is more complicated and intricate of what people usually think.

Chignell, Andrew: Real Repugnance and our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel. — In: *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism*. Glaube und Vernunft/Faith and Reason. Berlin/Boston. VII (2009), 135–159.

Kant zufolge muß ein Subjekt, um Wissen von einem Objekt zu erlangen, in der Lage sein zu „beweisen“, daß das Objekt real möglich sei, d.h. zu beweisen, daß es zwischen seinen Eigenschaften weder eine logische Inkonsistenz noch einen „realen Widerspruch“ gebe. Dies ist zwar (gewöhnlich) einfach im Hinblick auf empirische Objekte, aber im Hinblick auf einzelne Dinge an sich selbst (gewöhnlich) unmöglich zu erfüllen. Im ersten Abschnitt des Aufsatzes zeige ich, daß sich eine Version der Kantischen Auffassung bezüglich unserer Unwissenheit hinsichtlich der realen Möglichkeit – sowie eine Version seiner Antwort darauf – bereits in Lockes *Essay* findet. Im zweiten Abschnitt diskutiere ich die Art und Weise, in der diese „modale Bedingung“ zumindest zum Teil Kants berühmtes Verdikt gegen die Erkenntnis von Dingen an sich selbst motiviert. Im letzten Abschnitt untersuche ich H.'s Versuche, das Problem des realen Widerspruchs zu lösen und dadurch ein überkommenes Hindernis für das spekulative Wissen vom Übersinnlichen zu beseitigen.

Deng, Xiaomang/Zhang, Lin: Heidegger's Distortion of Dialectics in Hegel's Concept of Experience. — In: *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*. Beijing. 4 (2009), 2, 294–307.

This essay reveals five points in which Heidegger misreads H. in “Hegel's Concept of Experience:” (1) By forcedly introducing the concept of “will,” he interprets H.'s *Phenomenology of Spirit* into *Metaphysics of Presence*; (2) interprets concepts such as “statement” and “the road of skeptics” as the process of phenomenological reduction; (3) reduces H.'s “Sein” to “Seiendes;” (4) replaces “Contradiction” with “Ambiguity” so the active Dialectics become passive; (5) exaggerates conscious experience and puts it into a real ontology, regardless of the significance of *Logic* and *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*. By an analysis of this misreading we can find the internal connection between Heidegger's thought and that of his philosophical forerunner, H.

Dohrn, Daniel: Counterfactual Narrative Explanation. — In: *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism*. Philadelphia, PA. 67 (2009), 1, 37–47.

The article focuses on the epistemology of the thought processes involved for both authors and audiences of fictional literature. The author considers the theories of H. when constructing his own aesthetic propositions of fictional narratives which includes aspects of cognition taken from sensation, emotion, and conceptualization. A discussion of psychological literary criticism is presented. The author compares interpretations of fictional literature to scientific reports based on observation.

Duque Pajuelo, Félix: ¿Es ideal la realidad virtual? Hegel y los espectros. [Ist ideell die virtuelle Wirklichkeit? Hegel und die Gespenster.] — In: *Eikasia. Revista de filosofía*. Oviedo. 24 (2009), 1–23.

Ferreiro, Héctor: Reconstrucción del sistema de la voluntad en la filosofía de Hegel. [Rekonstruktion des Systems des Willens in der Philosophie Hegels.] — In: *Revista latinoamericana de filosofía*. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 331–361.

H. develops his theory of will simultaneously in two different contexts of his work: on one side, in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, the corresponding Berlin lessons and in texts which can be considered as incipient versions of the *Encyclopedia*; on the other hand, in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, the lessons based on them and in previous texts on the *Philosophy of Right* in which H. exposes his theory of subjective will. Now, the systematic structure and consequent periodization of the volitive process differ in both cases. This article aims to reconstruct H.'s System of the will by integrating organically the developments of both groups of texts.

Gallego, Eugenio: Cuando Hegel afrontó el terrorismo. [Als Hegel dem Terrorismus trotzte.] — In: *Claves de razón práctica*. Madrid. 192 (2009), 60–70.

García, George: Slavoj Žižek, lector de Hegel. [Der Hegel-Leser Slavoj Žižek.] — In: *Praxis. Revista del Departamento de Filosofía*. Heredia, CR. 63 (2009), 145–157.

di Giovanni, George: How Intimate an “Intimate of Lessing” Truly was Hegel? — In: *Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism. Glaube und Vernunft/Faith and Reason*. Berlin/Boston. VII (2009), 178–197.

Die Stationen auf dem konzeptuellen Weg, den H. vom Aufsatz *Die Positivität der christlichen Religion* (1795/96), als er gewiß ein „Vertrauter Lessings“ war, über das neue Vorwort, das er dem Aufsatz im Jahre 1800 voranstellte, bis zu dem Religionskapitel in der *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) zurücklegte, waren zugleich ebenso viele Schritte auf H.'s Weg einer Distanzierung von der Aufklärungskultur der Popularphilosophie. Der vorliegende Beitrag macht das Wesen dieser Kultur deutlich. H.'s Bruch mit ihr erfordert in seiner Konsequenz die Zurückweisung der Spinozistischen Substanzmetaphysik, die das intellektuelle Fundament dieser Kultur bildete. Im Jahre 1807 wäre Lessings *Nathan H.* vermutlich als nicht so weise erschienen, wie es vermutlich noch im Jahre 1795 der Fall war.

Gutschmidt, Holger: „Nus“ bei Aristoteles und Hegel. — In: Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. Hamburg. 51 (2009), 35–61.

Gutschmidt, Holger: Der Funktionswandel des Begriffs „Glauben“ bei Hegel. — In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism. Glaube und Vernunft/Faith and Reason. Berlin/Boston. VII (2009), 160–177.

My contribution concerns the concept “faith” in H.s works. In the first section, I investigate the semantics of “faith,” especially in relation to the development of the concept in Christian theology. The subject of the second section of the essay is the various functions that the concept has in the different phases of H.s philosophical development. I distinguish three such phases: the period of the “Early Theological Works,” the texts that are in critical engagement with contemporary philosophical matters from the time of H.s activity as an assistant professor in Jena, and the treatment of religion as a stage of Objective Spirit beginning with the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. I show how H. focuses on different aspects of the semantics of “faith” in these different phases but also chart which differences remain, all told, tied to the Christian concept of faith. I close by offering some remarks on the hermeneutics of H.ian concepts.

de la Higuera Espín, Javier: Propiedad y enajenación en la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel. [Eigentum und Veräußerung in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie.] — In: El Buho. Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Hill, Debbie J.: A Brief Commentary on the Hegelian–Marxist Origins of Gramsci’s ‘Philosophy of Praxis.’ — In: Educational Philosophy & Theory. Malden. 41 (2009), 6, 605–621.

The specific nuances of what Gramsci names ‘the new dialectic’ are explored in this paper. The dialectic was Marx’s specific ‘mode of thought’ or ‘method of logic’ as it has been variously called, by which he analyzed the world and man’s relationship to that world. As well as constituting a theory of knowledge (epistemology), what arises out of the dialectic is also an ontology or portrait of humankind that is based on the complete historicization of humanity; its ‘absolute “historicism”’ or ‘the absolute secularization and earthliness of thought,’ as Gramsci worded it (Gramsci, 1971, p. 465). Embracing a fully secular and historical view of humanity, it provides a vantage point that allows the multiple and complex effects of our own conceptual heritage to be interrogated in relation to our developing ‘nature’ or ‘being.’ The argument presented in this paper is that the legacy of both H. and Marx is manifest in the depth of Gramsci’s comprehension of what he termed the ‘educative–formative’ problem of hegemony. It is precisely the legacy of this H.ian–Marxist radical philosophical critique that is signified in his continuing commitment to the ‘philosophy of praxis’ and the historical–dialectical principles that underpin this worldview.

Horstmann, Rolf-Peter: La contradicción en Hegel. [Der Widerspruch bei Hegel.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 189–206.

In this paper, I argue against the idea of dealing with H.s philosophy as if it were based on obscure and inexplicable principles that can only be accepted as a fact for which no rational or philosophical explanation is available. In order to do it, I consider the aspect of H.s method which is con-

nected with the concept of contradiction. H.'s own conceptions of contradiction and objects can be considered as criticism of traditional metaphysics. The shortcomings of traditional metaphysics are seen by H. as a consequence of its incautious use of the subject-predicate structure of language which, as he holds, is inappropriate to express something true about objects as they really are; nevertheless, H. is convinced, at the same time, that this way of speaking about objects is unavoidable. H. tries to solve the resulting dilemma by introducing the concept of contradiction as a methodological rule by means of which the deficiencies of traditional metaphysics could be avoided.

Jaeschke, Walter: ‚Zeugnis des Geistes‘ oder: Vom Bedeutungswandel traditioneller Formeln. — In: Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism. Glaube und Vernunft/Faith and Reason. Berlin/Boston. VII (2009), 198–216.

In one of his very first essays H. remarks that the relation between faith and knowledge in his time has been transformed by the “glorious victory” of enlightened reason “internal to philosophy itself” – albeit transformed not exactly to the benefit of the victor. H. accordingly regards it to be an important task of philosophy to contribute a less antagonistic account of the relation of reason to faith. Nevertheless, the solution to this problem that H. reaches in his late *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* is of the same ambiguity as these lectures themselves. While he does indeed hold that the “testimony of the spirit” is the “absolute ground of faith,” still the spirit that testifies, as well as the spirit to whom the testimony is given, is not the spirit anymore mentioned in the traditional notion of *testimonium internum spiritus*; on both sides there is the human spirit, which is the Divine element of men.

Jiménez Colodrero, Andrés: El liberalismo autoritario hegeliano o Hegel entre Hobbes y Schmitt. [Hegels autoritärer Liberalismus oder Hegel zwischen Hobbes und Schmitt.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 363–387.

Was H.'s political philosophy, in a proper sense, “liberal?” For Renato Cristi the answer is a negative one. Without being a reactionary, H. never developed a “progressive liberalism,” as many contemporary interpreters tend to think: instead it consisted in an “authoritarian liberalism” with a strong emphasis in authority than in freedom. H. built his theory of the state with an absolute power monarch whose task should be to pacify civil society's struggling tendencies. By this way, H.'s thought will be close of the classical authoritarian formulations of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. Cristi's thesis have to be analyzed both historical and conceptual, with special regard to his sources.

Jiménez Sánchez, José Joaquín: Los tres errores de Hegel. [Die drei Irrtümer Hegels.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Kitarô, Nishida: La dialectique de Hegel considérée de ma position. — In: Philosophie. Paris. 103 (2009), 56–76.

Koch, Anton Friedrich: Espaço e tempo em Kant e Hegel. [Raum und Zeit bei Kant und Hegel.] — In: *Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos*. 11 (2009), 57–73.

The present paper aims to understand the H.ian conception of space and time as realizing a desideratum which remained unfulfilled in Kant's transcendental aesthetics. It is argued that a conservative modification of the Kantian theory of space and time is required to avoid a contradiction which otherwise would arise within the distinction between transcendental ideality and empirical reality of space and time. However, even in the revised version the Kantian conception does not explain the mediation of space and time with our discursive thinking. As will be argued, the H.ian deduction of space and time aims to reconcile space and time in a discursive way, thus trying to dissolve this enigma.

Kühn, Rolf: Hegel und der Logos als „Licht“ der spekulativen Vernunft. Zur frühen Kritik Hegels am Johannesprolog und seiner dialektischen Rezeption. — In: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*. Freiburg i. Brsg. 56 (2009), 2, 370–389.

Largier, Niklaus: Mysticism, Modernity, and the Invention of Aesthetic Experience. — In: *Representations*. Berkeley, CA. 105 (2009), 1, 37–60.

This article discusses the interpretation of Medieval European Christian mystics by modern and postmodern philosophers such as H., Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida. The interpretation of these mystical experiences is complicated by the fact that they originated before the process of secularization associated with the Reformation. The origins of such interpretations in the development of vernacular texts on mystical experience are considered. The impact of the emergence of the public sphere and the printing press on the interpretation of personal religious experience is considered as a factor in the changing character of mysticism.

Lázaro Paniagua, Alfonso: Notas para una exposición sobre la persona en Hegel. [Abhandlung über die Person bei Hegel.] — In: *El Buhó: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía*. 6 (2009).

Martín Navarro, Alejandro: La subjetividad extravagante (a propósito del juicio de Hegel sobre Novalis). [Die extravagante Subjektivität (zum Thema des Urteils Hegels über Novalis).] — In: *Anales del seminario de historia de la filosofía*. Madrid. 26 (2009), 169–184.

Taking into account H.s suggestion on Novalis' thought, we will outline the main characteristics of the concept of subjectivity for this author. Firstly, we will show the context in which this theory emerges. Secondly, we will elaborate on its relation with the question of Statement. Lastly, we will point out some aspects of Novalis' Philosophy related to his conception of Subject, such as the questions of Art, Religion and men's destiny in History.

Meckstroth, Christopher: The Struggle for Democracy: Paradox and History in Democratic Progress. — In: *Constellations: An International Journal of Critical & Democratic Theory*. Oxford. 16 (2009), 3, 410–428.

In this article the author highlights a paradox in the idea of democratic progress by defining progress based on the realization of the people's will which tends to foreclose self-reflexive, democratic engagement between different notions of progress. An argument is adapted by the author from H.s *Phenomenology* to suggest that one real-world instantiation of democratic ideals be compared to another. The author also discusses Jürgen Habermas' concept of reflexive democracy.

Montecinos Fabio, Sergio: Conexiones metodológicas entre las filosofías de Platón y Hegel: la lectura hegeliana de la dialéctica platónica. [Methodologische Verknüpfungen zwischen den Philosophien Platons und Hegels: die Hegelsche Lektüre der Platonischen Dialektik.] — In: *Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía*. Madrid. 4 (2009), 107–124.

This paper seeks to explore some of the connections between the philosophies of Plato and H., through a reconstruction of H.s reading of certain passages in the Platonic *corpus*. Specifically, this paper gives a reconstruction of his distinctive appropriation-comprehension of ancient dialectic, insisting on the profound methodological and ontological implications of this on speculative thought. H., surprisingly, found in Plato the possibility of considering the difference as a *constitutive* element of thought, not its opposite. This allows establishing one's amphibological identity with being.

de Oliveira Moraes, Alfredo: O Fim da Matéria e a Re-significação da Physis. [Das Ende der Materie und die Neubestimmung der Physis.] — In: *Revista Eletrônica Estudos Hegelianos*. 6 (2009), 11, 7–18.

The author intends to resume H.s philosophy of nature in the light of the contributions of actual science, especially of physics, and to offer a new reading of the H.ian text, its consequences and implications, from the perspective of a metaphysics founded on a non-material basis.

Mudded, Anna: Risky Subjectivity: Antigone, Action, and Universal Trespass. — In: *Human Studies. A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences*. Dordrecht. 32 (2009), 2, 183–200.

In this paper, I draw on the mutually implicated structures of tragedy and self-formation found in H.s use of Sophocles' *Antigone* in the *Phenomenology*. By emphasizing the apparent distinction between particular and universal in H.s reading of the tragedies in *Antigone*, I propose that a tragedy of action (which particularizes a universal) is inescapable for subjectivity understood as socially constituted and always already socially engaged. I consider universal/particular relations in three communities: H.s Greek polis, his community of conscience, and my reading of certain feminist communities. The position I propose establishes a ground from which to approach subjects, and implies that all subjects may be understood as the result of relations embodying potential tragedy. This speaks to contemporary concerns about marginalization, identity articulation, and relations of recognition.

Muñoz Villafranca, Fidel: La sociedad civil en Hegel. [Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft bei Hegel.] — In: *El Buhó: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía*. 6 (2009).

Païpétis, Ph: Le problème du mal dans la philosophie de l'histoire de Hegel. — In: Diōtima. Lisboa. 37 (2009), 150–164.

Palomar Torralbo, Agustín: Exterioridad, moralidad y acción. El lugar de la moralidad hegeliana en la dialéctica exterioridad/interioridad. [Äußerlichkeit, Moralität und Handlung. Der Ort der Hegelschen Moralität in der Dialektik Äußerlichkeit/Innerlichkeit.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Perinetti, Darío: Inferencia y racionalidad en Hegel. [Schluß und Rationalität bei Hegel.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 253–285.

H.s Logic is usually read as a book in metaphysics. Against this reading, I will argue that it ought rather to be read as a philosophy of logic, the main feature of which is its critique of formalism. The following claims capture the core of H.s anti-formalism: 1) formalism cannot explain logical validity; 2) logical properties cannot be reduced to grammatical properties; 3) the content of every concept can be accounted for in terms of the inferential relations it holds with other concepts; 4) logical validity can be accounted for in terms of the relations a reasoning maintains with some conceptual contents (Ideas). This conception of logic results from a radicalization of a Kantian thesis and aims at a normative theory of conceptual practices, not at an ontology.

Raga Rosaleny, Vicente: Hegel y la pregunta moderna: escepticismo, ironía y subjetividad en la Fenomenología del espíritu. [Hegel und die neuzeitliche Frage: Skeptizismus, Ironie und Subjektivität in der Phänomenologie des Geistes.] — In: Revista Tales. Madrid. 2 (2009), 198–206.

Ramos Salguero, José: La cosmovisión moral en la fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. [Die moralische Weltanschauung in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Ramos Salguero, José: Ley y justicia en Hegel. [Gesetz und Gerechtigkeit bei Hegel.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Raters, Marie-Luise: Von Hegel zu Darwin. Die Wurzeln von Deweys Ästhetik in der Ästhetik des angelsächsischen Idealismus. — In: Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt. 34 (2009), 3, 395–415.

Reynolds, Jack: The Master-slave dialectic and the “sado-masochistic entity”: Some Objections. — In: Angelaki. Journal of the Theoretical Humanities. Oxford. 14 (2009), 3, 11–25.

The article reports on the study which examines the exposition of the treatment of H. on the master-slave dialectic and the objections raised by Gilles Deleuze using contradiction, opposition, and negativity. Accordingly, the master is always psychically dependent upon the slave that continues to recognize his authority. However, a paradoxical reversal of the positions of master and slave belongs to the unhappy consciousness caused by the domination that persists between them.

Rocco Lozano, Valerio: De la cuádruple fuga de Eleusis. [Die vierfache Fuge von Eleusis.] — In: Despalabro: Ensayos de humanidades. Madrid. 3 (2009), 73–82.

Rocco Lozano, Valerio: Geometría, lógica y metafísica en la interpretación hegeliana del Timeo. [Geometrie, Logik und Metaphysik in der Hegelschen Interpretation des Timaios.] — In: Revista Tales. Madrid. 2 (2009), 186–197.

In the H.ian interpretation of *Timaeus* 31b–c an important deformation can be found: the translation of the term analogy as *Schluß*. Through this translation of a passage whose content is mere geometrical in a logical and metaphysical way, H. wants to show that his own theory of the speculative syllogism was already present, in nuce, in Plato’s philosophy. This has important consequences in the theological field, with his interpretation of the “sundered mean.”

Romero Soto, María Isabel/Romero Soto, Rafael: El bien y la conciencia moral en Hegel. De la moralidad a la eticidad. [Das Gute und das moralische Gewissen bei Hegel. Von der Moralität zur Sittlichkeit.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

del Rosario Acosta López, María: Critical Encounters: Between Ethics and Politics – From Eumenides to Antigone: Developing Hegel’s Notion of Recognition, Responding to Honneth. — In: Philosophy Today. Chicago, Ill. 53 (2009), 190–200.

Ross, Nathan: “Nothing human is foreign to me:” On the role of difference in Hegel’s Aesthetics. — In: Philosophy Today. Chicago. 53 (2009), 4, 337–347.

I will argue that, for H., conveying modes of experience, and particularly “passions” that lie outside the “ethos” of the spectator gives the arts a function and task that is both irreducible to the contents of other modes of absolute spirit, as well as positive in the sense of advancing the adequacy of absolute spirit in its own self-comprehension. My reading will highlight the role of “difference” in H.’s aesthetics in two senses: it will emphasize that H. recognizes an irreducible, on-going difference in function between the arts and other modes of objective spirit; and it will demonstrate that this function actually consists in the capacity of the arts to communicate modes of subjectivity that are “different” than what a subject can comprehend using concepts or otherwise relate to on the level of feeling.

de la Rubia Guijarro, José Antonio: Injusticia y delito en Hegel. [Ungerechtigkeit und Delikt bei Hegel.] — In: El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

Rühle, Volker: La insistencia de la muerte en la vida: Hegel después de Heidegger. [Die Beharrlichkeit des Todes im Leben. Hegel nach Heidegger.] — In: Bajo palabra. Revista de filosofía. Madrid. 4 (2009), 11–20.

According to Heidegger's critique, H. would have subjected death to the logical consequences of speculative thought, thus depriving death of the sting of its negativity – such a critique belongs nowadays to the commonplaces of the confrontation with H.'s thought. However, if one reads H. *after* Heidegger, and considers the unsolved problems of Heidegger's thinking on death, H.'s concept of death emerges under a new light. Particularly because it was precisely the fact that H. did not hide the negativity of death from the consideration of thought, which allowed him to conceive of death as an immanent, pervasive and ever changing dimension of life. Only in this way becomes intelligible that death is not just an absolute negation of life, but also an unconditional claim governing it, and constitutive of life's temporal "form."

Sáez Rueda, Luis: Eticidad y negatividad en la filosofía del derecho de Hegel. [Sittlichkeit und Negativität in Hegels Rechtsphilosophie.] — In: El Buho. Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía. 6 (2009).

de la Maza Samhaber, Luis Mariano: Comienzo, negatividad y experiencia en la confrontación de Heidegger y Hegel. [Anfang, Negativität und Erfahrung in der Gegenüberstellung von Heidegger und Hegel.] — In: Veritas. Revista de Filosofía y Teología. Lo Vásquez, Casablanca, RCH. 21 (2009), 323–339.

de la Maza Samhaber, Luis Mariano: El sentido del reconocimiento en Hegel. [Der Sinn der Anerkennung bei Hegel.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online] 35 (2009), 2, 227–251.

Sánchez Fernández, José Manuel: La proposición especulativa y su reflejo en la construcción de la filosofía del espíritu de Hegel. [Der spekulative Satz und seine Spiegelung in der Konstruktion der Geistesphilosophie Hegels.] — In: Fragmentos de filosofía. Sevilla. 7 (2009), 87–111.

Seibold, Jorge R.: Relecturas actuales de la doctrina hegeliana del „reconocimiento“: Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor y Paul Ricoeur. [Aktuelle Relektüre der Hegelschen Lehre der „Anerkennung“: Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor und Paul Ricoeur.] — In: Stromata. San Miguel, RA. 65 (2009), 1–2, 45–73.

Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin: Hegel und die Romantik. — In: Frischmann, Bärbel/Millán-Zaibert, Elizabeth (Hgg.): *Innovation und Aktualität frühromantischer Philosophie*. Paderborn 2009. 39–49.

In seiner Kritik an der überschwänglichen Selbstgewißheit der Aufklärung steht H. auf der Seite der romantischen Bewegung, in seiner vehementen Ablehnung der Subjektivität jedes Ironismus aber wendet er sich besonders scharf gegen Friedrich Schlegel.

Stewart, Jon: Hegel's Teleology of World Religions and the Disanalogy of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. — In: *Acta Kierkegardiana*. Toronto, CA. 4 (2009), 17–31.

In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, on the *History of Philosophy* and *Aesthetics*, H. traces his subject matter right up to his own day, ending with accounts of, respectively, the Restoration, the contemporary philosophical scene (including figures such as Fichte and Schelling), and German Romanticism. Given this, it is somewhat odd that in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* his historical account of the different world religions ends in Christianity, a stage that would, historically speaking, correspond to the Roman world in his other lectures. In this paper I will address this disanalogy and explore its implications for the systematic nature of H.s philosophical thinking.

Sze, Jennifer Ang Mei: Whither Hegelian Dialectics in Sartrean Violence? — In: *Sartre Studies International*. Oxford. 15 (2009), 1, 1–23.

Sartrean ontological intersubjectivity is often understood to be hostile and conflictive, and Sartrean dialectics is repeatedly interpreted through the lenses of the H.ian master-slave dyad, translating into a conflictive theory of practical ensembles. Building on this, critics in the aftermath of 9/11 argued that 'terror' and 'revolutionary violence' introduced in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* as the anti-thesis of oppression underscored his anti-colonial writings and this gives us justification to think that Sartre might consider terrorism a form of revolutionary violence. With this in mind, this paper does not deal with the bigger issue of Sartre's political position, but only aims to question the basis of reading H.ian dialectics in Sartre's ontology of intersubjectivity and social ensembles. Revisiting the role of dialectics in his *Search for a Method* and *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, it reveals a Sartre who is critical of H.ian dialectics, and establishes his intersubjectivity as more compatible with Heidegger's being-with-others rather than H.s being-for-others.

Tejero, Rafael: El estado contra la república (La teoría hegeliana del estado). [Der Staat gegen die Republik (Die Hegelsche Staatstheorie).] — In: *El Buho: Revista electrónica de la Asociación Andaluza de Filosofía*. 6 (2009).

Téllez Aguilar, Alexander: La mujer indeseable: el modelo de lo femenino según Hegel. [Die unerwünschte Frau: das Modell des Weiblichen bei Hegel.] — In: *Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica*. San José, CR. 47 (2009), 120–121, 71–76.

This essay shows the vision of H. about the woman in some main works and the same time criticize his conception about the female with the contribution of feminist critic theory, and indicate the impossibility systematic-conceptual to add H. like a philosopher of the feminist movement.

Testa, Italo: Second Nature and Recognition: Hegel and the Social Space. — In: *Critical Horizons*. London. 10 (2009), 3, 341–370.

The article discusses the relationship between the notions of second nature and recognition. It talks on the problems in the theory of recognition such as circularity and inadequacy of constructivism. It offers proposal that is crucial in bringing into focus the problems connected with the theory of “space of reasons” obtained from the H.ian concept of “Spirit.” It mentions that creating a clear theory of second nature is needed to make adequate conception of recognition and space of reasons.

Trisokkas, Ioannis: The Speculative Logical Theory of Universality. — In: *Owl of Minerva*. Charlottesville. 40 (2009), 2, 141–172.

Speculative logical theory, as provided in H.’s *Science of Logic*, consists of three main parts: the logic of being, the logic of essence, and the logic of the concept. The peculiar character of each logic’s starting point determines the most general character of each logic’s development. The present paper aims at making explicit the character of the starting-point of the third logic, the logic of the concept. This starting-point is exemplified by the category of universality; it is shown (a) that the fundamental determination of this category is the harmonious unity of self-identity and full determinacy and (b) that this unity has necessarily the logical structure of “double shining.” The latter is described in detail and justification is provided as to why it is preferred from “single shining.” I conclude the paper by defending the structure of “double shining” against certain objections raised against it by Friedrike Schick and Christian Iber.

Tufano, Giuseppe: El saber absoluto como problema en la Fenomenología del espíritu de G. W. F. Hegel. [Das absolute Wissen als Problem in der Phänomenologie des Geistes.] — In: *Pensamiento: Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica*. Madrid. 65 (2009), 243, 161–175.

Urabayen Pérez, Julia: Leyendo a Hegel con Hannah Arendt: la crítica a la filosofía política y la comprensión de la política después de los tiempos de oscuridad. [Hegel lesen mit Hannah Arendt: die Kritik an der politischen Philosophie und das Verständnis der Politik nach den Zeiten der Dunkelheit.] — In: *La Torre del Virrey. Revista de Estudios Culturales*. Valencia. 7 (2009), 69–78.

Vernon, Jim †: Free Love: A Hegelian Defense of Same-Sex Marriage Rights. — In: *Southern Journal of Philosophy*. Malden. 47 (2009), 1, 69–89.

By revisiting H.’s *Philosophy of Right*, I mount a H.ian defense of same-sex marriage rights. I first argue that H.’s account of the Idea of freedom articulates both the necessity of popular shifts in the determinations of the institutions of right, as well as the duty to struggle to progressively actualize freedom through them. I then contend that H., by grounding marriage in free consent, clears the path for expanding this ethical institution to include all monogamous couples. Lastly, I close by sketching the specifically H.ian reasons we ought to actively struggle to expand the institution of marriage.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Le dédoublement de la nature chez Hegel. — In: Christophe Bouton/Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron (Éd.): Hegel et la philosophie de la nature. Paris 2009. 33–46. (Collection „Recherches sur l'idéalisme et le romantisme allemands“. IV)

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: Reconnaissance et réconciliation chez Hegel, Bergson et Lavelle. — In: Archivio di Filosofia. Pisa/Roma. 2–3 (2009), 145–154. (Numéro spécial „Riconoscimento e comunità a partire da Hegel“.)

Vieweg, Klaus: Pobreza y riqueza: derecho de socorro y derecho de resistencia en Hegel. [Armut und Reichtum: Notrecht und Widerstandsrecht bei Hegel.] — In: Estudios de Filosofía. Medellín, CO. 39 (2009), 137–152.

In the *Philosophy of Law*, H. devotes special attention to one of the most worrying problems of modern societies and states: the unbalanced distribution of richness and its consequent chain of social inequalities and unjustness. In his analysis, H. stresses the idea that the conformation of a just civil society and a rational state or state of law, depends entirely on the Recognizance, on the part of these spheres, of the Rights of all the individuals who shall enjoy with dignity material possessions, that will enable them not only the assurance of the material conditions of existence, but also the participation and enjoyment of material and spiritual goods that sustain and give dynamics to “life in common.” According to H.s diagnosis, such a Recognizance has, certainly, its point of departure in the realms of Abstract Law and stretches into the realm of Morality, in which realms the individual is recognized as a person and as a moral being, but it is only in the superior realm of Ethics where the Recognizance of all the rights that guarantee an honorable life, acquires universal validity and need, since it is this said sphere, concretely in the sphere of the state, where the said Recognizance can take a hold in the different legal and juridical stances that conform it. Such is the path through which the Political Philosophy of H. tries to offer a solution to a problem that, such as the one pointed out, is still a threat to societies at present and questions the selfsame structures of power. Independently of the viability of the offered solution, the Political Philosophy of H. begs for a pertinent and unquestionable actuality.

Vieweg, Klaus: La fuerza suave sobre las imágenes: La concepción filosófica de Hegel de la imaginación. [Die sanfte Kraft über die Bilder: Hegels philosophische Auffassung der Einbildungskraft.] — In: Revista latinoamericana de filosofía. [online]. 35 (2009), 2, 207–225.

The purpose of a philosophy of mind (“*Geist*”) can only be to introduce the concept (“*Begriff*”) into the knowledge of mind. H.s massive insistence on the concept, on the logos of knowledge, may appear oddly anachronistic in view of current theories of knowledge. Even so, the author is going to recommend precisely such a seeming anachronism and argue for the enduring and decisive value of H.s concept of imagination for current philosophical reflection on knowledge. What might at first look like a dusty attic will soon reveal extensive and unfamiliar treasures and offer the cornerstone for a modern philosophy of knowledge and aesthetics, for a new theory of symbolic forms, for a new logic of signs. H. was, according to Derrida, the founder of modern semiology. His theory provides an Ariadne thread leading out of the labyrinth of conflicting opinions about the nature of the imagination.

Vujeva, Domagoj: Prilog genealogiji Hegelova poimanja građanskog društva. [Beiträge zur Genealogie des Hegelschen Begriffs der Zivilgesellschaft.] — In: *Politicka Misao*. [Political Thought: Croatian Political Science Review.] Zagreb. 46 (2009), 3, 157–173.

The starting point in this article is H.s mature understanding of civil society as the birthplace of the modern meaning of the concept. Since this understanding is primarily the consequence of H.s coming to terms with political economy, the author problematizes H.s first attempt at incorporating modern economic topics into ethical totality in the 1802 Article on Natural Law. It is shown how the fundamental paradox of the first variety of H.s science of the state is his effort to renew the classical natural law framework in circumstances of modern economic and political life. It is for this reason that H. fails to see the full extent of the emancipatory potential and the specifically modern character of the system of economic and private-legal interdependence of individuals, thus, on the one hand, interpreting these as the consequence of the disintegration of antique ethical life while, on the other hand, in the construction of ethical totality, placing its members in the estate of the unfree. It is precisely due to this historical point of origin of these systems and the ways they incorporate into ethical totality that the article on natural law, concludes the author, cannot be seen as the place where H. finally formulated his theory of civil society.

Westphal, Kenneth R.: Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. — In: *Dialogue*. Kingston, Ont./Montreal. 48 (2009), 4, 753–800.

Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant's and H.s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the "autonomy" of rational judgment and one key point of H.s account of "mutual recognition." These themes are rooted in Kant's and H.s transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms.

Yevlampiev, Igor: Man and Mind in the Philosophy of Boris N. Chicherin. — In: *Studies in East European Thought*. Dordrecht. 61, (2009), 2/3, 113–121. (Themenheft: The Discourse of Personality in the Russian Intellectual Tradition)

This paper considers the philosophical and political views of B. N. Chicherin. Chicherin was one of H.s better known followers in Russian philosophy. Chicherin transformed H.s ideas to such an extent that the main concept of his philosophy became the concept of the person, and the main problem was the description of the person's connection to the Absolute. Chicherin was also known as a representative of the liberal tradition in Russia. However, he criticized classical western liberalism for belittling the value of the state. Chicherin's liberal theory was under construction in a dialectical combination of two principles: recognition of the absolute value of the person and its freedom and recognition of the necessity of a strong state for the solution of some general problems in the absence of which it will be impossible to realize the principle of freedom in all its completeness.

Ayala Saavedra, Roberto: Hegel, Marxismo y Epistemología. [Hegel, Marxismus und Epistemologie.] — In: Praxis. Revista del Departamento de Filosofía. Heredia, CR. 61 (2008), 25–52.

De Beistegui, Miguel: The Erosion of Democracy. — In: Research in Phenomenology. Leiden. 38 (2008), 2, 157–173.

This paper analyzes the reasons behind what it calls the erosion of democracy under George W. Bush's presidency since September 11, 2001, and claims that they are twofold: first, the erosion in question can be attributed to a crisis of the state and the belief that security is its only genuine function. In other words, the erosion of democracy is an erosion of the very idea of the public sphere (which, following H., I call "ethical life") beyond security and war. Secondly, the erosion of the ethical sphere goes hand in hand with an extraordinary resurgence of what, still following H., I call "morality," and which privileges the subjective over the objective, or moral (and even religious) feeling over institutions and the law.

Berchams Vallet de Goytisoló, Juan: Lo desechado y lo recibido de la concepción filosófica de Hegel por la ciencia del derecho del siglo XX. [Das Weggeworfene und das Empfangene der Philosophie Hegels in der Rechtswissenschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts.] Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas. Madrid. 85 (2008), 253–268.

Binetti, María José: Hegel y el neo-hegelianismo francés: una nueva identidad. [Hegel und der französische Neuhegelianismus: eine neue Identität.] — In: Contrastes: Revista interdisciplinar de filosofía. Málaga. 13 (2008), 295–311.

Far from breaking with H.'s Absolute Idealism, French Contemporary Philosophy seems to ensure its continuity. In fact, the new concept of identity through which the H.ian speculation overcame the immovable rigidity of substance and the bipolar logic of representative thought, has settled the speculative base of what nowadays French Philosophy includes again under the categories of difference, repetition, dissemination, impossibility, excess, paradox, instant, etc. The eternal return of the same, the event that happens to finite and the aporia of an actual contradiction are different names through which the "school of difference" claims the rationality of *Aufhebung*, which overflows and contains all abstract discrimination.

Binetti, María José: El estadio religioso de Kierkegaard en las categorías lógicas de Hegel: identidad y diferencia. [Das religiöse Stadium Kierkegaards in den logischen Kategorien Hegels: Identität und Differenz.] — In: Estudios filosóficos. Valladolid. 57 (2008), 166, 409–422.

The present paper analyzes the Kierkegaardian aesthetical stage in order to show how its internal dynamism confirms in singular existence some categories, which H.'s *Logic* affirms as structure and meaning of reality as a whole. Thus, the author sets out to address the topic which contrasts

Kierkegaardian and H.ian thoughts, as she points out the coincidences of a same metaphysical fundamental orientation.

Bordignon, Michaela: Giudizio infinito e struttura coscienziale. [Unendliches Urteil und bewußte Struktur.] — In: verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 141–167.

The article analyzes the meaning of infinite judgment within absolute knowing and tries to explain the role that this judgment plays within the last moment of the phenomenological path. The infinite judgment in question states: “the being of the ego is a thing.” The analysis starts with the conception of infinite judgment in pre-Kantian and Kantian logic that has certainly influenced the way in which H. conceived of his logical structure. In order to shed light on the H.ian conception of infinite judgment at the time the *Phenomenology* was written, it is necessary to examine the way in which this kind of judgment is presented in the Jena System (1804/05) which develops the logical structures at work in the phenomenological process. Finally, the negation implicit in the judgment “the being of the ego is a thing” is expounded upon: the being of the ego is a thing – the soul – that actually is not a thing. The paradoxical structure of this judgment that consists of this absence-presence negation, becomes evident in this double value. This judgment expresses the moment of crisis in the structure of judgment itself. This crisis is the linguistic expression of the inconsistency immanent in the pretence of consciousness to capture its object that is constitutively separated from it. At the same time this judgment is also the negative moment necessary for the solution of this crisis and for the passage of consciousness into absolute knowing, in which the radical separation between subject and object that characterizes consciousness is completely reconciled.

Cabello, Ana Sofia: Pretensiones éticas: Una revisión de Hegel y Habermas. [Ethische Ansprüche. Eine Revision von Hegel und Habermas.] — In: Apuntes Filosóficos. Caracas, YV. 33 (2008), 151–164.

Two important ethical conceptions in the history of the philosophy have in common the pretension to establish universal parameters, in order to motivate their recognition from all human beings: the ethical proposal of H. and Habermas. In their study it is necessary to place them in perspective with some notions of Kant and Mead, to evaluate the overcoming that is tried to make from the formal ethic to the pragmatic-formal of the dialogue ethic proposed by Habermas.

Cecchinato, Giorgia: „Er-innerung“ e arte. Riflessioni sull'esperienza estetica a partire dalla „Fenomenologia dello spirito“. [„Er-innerung“ und Kunst. Reflexionen über die ästhetische Erfahrung im Ausgang von der „Phänomenologie des Geistes“.] — In: verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 201–223.

The aim of this paper is to show the importance of the concept of “*Er-innerung*” to understand H.'s conception of art experience. The analysis will begin by referring to the last chapter of the *Phenomenology*, “absolute knowing,” where this concept is dealt with. The second step will be to go through the *Phenomenology* itself to verify how H. uses this concept in connection with the artistic religion of ancient Greece. According to H., the “*Er-innerung*” does not only represent the

constitutive historicity of every experience, especially the artistic one; it is also the only way in which one can establish a relation with art, either as an artist or as an art “user.” By looking at the *Lectures on Aesthetics* it will be shown that the “inwardizing,” i.e. the “*Er-innerung*” itself, is precisely the “move towards the inside” that represents the essence of the art experience. It will be shown that this understanding of the “*Er-innerung*” provides a sound interpretation of art, including the evolution that has led to contemporary art.

Cesaroni, Pierpaolo: *Struttura della coscienza e sapere assoluto. La „Unruhe“ nella „Fenomenologia dello spirito“*. [Struktur des Bewußtseins und absolutes Wissen. Die „Unruhe“ in der „Phänomenologie des Geistes“.] — In: *verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.]* Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 83–104.

The aim of this article is to consider the connection between the structure of consciousness and absolute knowing, starting from the notion of “*Unruhe*,” “restlessness.” This word has two different meanings in the *Phenomenology*: 1) in the Introduction, H. uses it in order to define the experience of natural consciousness; 2) in the last chapter it refers to the dialectical movement of the Concept. These two different meanings are strictly connected. The “*Unruhe*” that H. recognizes in every experience of consciousness implies an original conception of the relation between consciousness and its objects and between consciousness and truth. These aspects have been pointed out by the french interpretations of the *Phenomenology*, from Kojève and Hyppolite up to Lacan and Foucault. This restlessness of consciousness derives from the spiritual element (“*Geist*”) that appears progressively in every experience of consciousness itself. This first meaning of “*Unruhe*” is therefore based on the second one. Then absolute knowing, that is, the overcoming of every difference between consciousness and its object, does not imply the disappearing of restlessness. On the contrary, “*Unruhe*” actually finds in absolute knowing its strongest expression, as essential restlessness of the Concept. The “*Unruhe*” that every consciousness goes through is therefore the sign of its belonging to the life of Spirit.

Chessick, Richard D.: *The Relevance of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit to the Process of Contemporary Psychoanalysis*. — In: *Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis & Dynamic Psychiatry*. New York, NY. 36 (2008), 4, 677–706.

Do changes in psychoanalytic technique represent progress in knowledge or are they for the most part a sideways movement in tune with the particular changes in the socioeconomic milieu of the day? H. raised the question in the area of philosophy when discussing the stages in the development of self-consciousness. For him this was an inevitable development toward a greater and greater self-understanding, going through various phases until Absolute Spirit (Mind) became completely cognizant of itself. This metaphysical conception was the cornerstone of H.'s thought as first presented in his chaotic masterpiece, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In this article I will examine his philosophical vision as expressed in that masterpiece, compare it with that of Freud, and discuss aspects of it that are pertinent to the practice of contemporary psychoanalysis.

Corrales Vásquez, Greivin: *Hegel y el lenguaje: Consideraciones en torno a la producción de sentido. [Hegel und die Sprache: Überlegungen zur Sinnproduktion.]* — In: *Praxis. Revista del Departamento de Filosofía*. Heredia, CR. 61 (2008), 121–134.

Croce, Benedetto: An Unknown Page from the Last Months of Hegel's Life. — In: *New Vico Studies*. Atlanta, GA. 26 (2008), 143–165.

The article presents the translation of the dialogue form essay *An Unknown Page from the Last Months of Hegel's Life* by Benedetto Croce. The essay is a representation of Croce's mature thoughts on the philosophy of H. which is about the two wishes stemmed from his idealism on H.ian basis. According to Croce, the materials he used are based on the historical foundation and traces that can be found in the 19th century Neapolitan culture or in the middle of the century.

Cubo Ugarte, Oscar: Hegel: ¿más allá del bien y del mal? [Hegel: jenseits von Gut und Böse?] — *Estudios de Filosofía*. Medellín, CO. 37 (2008), 11–30.

Derry, Jan: Abstract rationality in education: from Vygotsky to Brandom. — In: *Studies in Philosophy & Education*. Dordrecht. 27 (2008), 1, 49–62.

Abstract rationality has increasingly been a target of attack in contemporary educational research and practice and in its place practical reason and situated thinking have become a focus of interest. The argument here is that something is lost in this. In illustrating how we might think about the issue, this paper makes a response to the charge that as a result of his commitment to the 'Enlightenment project' Vygotsky holds abstract rationality as the pinnacle of thought. Against this it is argued that Vygotsky had a far more sophisticated appreciation of reason and of its remit. The paper proceeds first by examining the picture of Vygotsky that is presented in the work of James Wertsch, and especially his claim that Vygotsky was an ambivalent rationalist, goes on to provide an account of Vygotsky that corrects this picture, and develops this in the light of the work of Robert Brandom, who shares Vygotsky's inheritance of H. The conclusion towards which this piece points is that the philosophical underpinnings of Vygotsky's work provide a radically different idea of rationality and epistemology from that characterised as abstract rationality and that this has significance for education studies.

Espinoza Lolas, Ricardo A.: Arte y religión en la „Phänomenologie des Geistes“ de Hegel a la luz de la „Wissenschaft der Logik“. [Kunst und Religion in Hegels „Phänomenologie des Geistes“ im Lichte der „Wissenschaft der Logik“.] — In: *Διαμων*. Revista de Filosofía. Murcia. 43 (2008), 71–91.

From its beginning, the H.ian thought understood that art was not a radical way to access in the Absolute. What we seek here, is to show how this idea was articulated in the *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, and thus see how all H.'s later thoughts proceed from these assumptions. The Absolute – understood from his dialectics – acquires a unique sense in the history of thought. Actually, art is not annihilated, but assimilated in a specific kind of religion: Greek religion.

Franck, Juan Francisco: Giovanni Gentile y la dialéctica hegeliana. [Giovanni Gentile und die Hegelsche Dialektik.] — In: *Revista de filosofía*. Ibero, Ciudad de México. 40 (2008), 122, 183–203.

Garavito Zuloaga, Julián Pablo: Hegel y el poder ignorado del referente: la fotografía. [Hegel und die ignorierte Macht der Referenz: die Photographie.] — In: La lámpara de Diógenes. Revista semestral de filosofía. Puebla, Mexico. 9 (2008), 16–17, 81–98.

Garcés Ferrer, Rocío: Espectros de Hegel en la „archipolítica“ heideggeriana. [Hegels Gespenster in der Heideggerianischen „Archipolitik“.] — In: La Torre del Virrey. Revista de estudios culturales. L'Elia, Valencia, ES. 5 (2008), 47–54.

From an internal distinction into the speculative logic between spiritual and spectral logics, this paper searches the traces of H.s spectrums in the Heideggerian's archipolitics. The main argument is the position of Kierkegaard against H.ian dialectics in order to see how Heidegger's ontology depends on Kierkegaard's comprehension of social link in terms of nivelation and abstraction; in terms of the "phantom of publics" and the "spectrum of pure interiority." Therefore, the hidden presence of H.ian spectrums in Heidegger's thought is conditioning his understanding of community because of the most immediately ties that its finity implies: the "*Geworfenheit*," the main role of the "*Stimmungen*" and the historical destiny of german "*Volks-gemeinschaft*." This pathos will not lead us to an exit of idealism but to its perversion: this is the "spectrum of hiderism".

Gasché, Rodolphe: The Harmless Detail: On Hegel's Aesthetics. — In: Mosaic: A Journal for the Interdisciplinary Study of Literature. Winnipeg, CA-MB. 41 (2008), 4, 41–59.

The article focuses on H.s analysis of Greek and contemporary statuary. It specifically refers to the word "detail," which, according to H., is intimately linked to the sphere of the fine arts. The article shows how detail is linked to the measurement of the human figure, in particular to the size of its feet. In spite of the numerous details that the H.s *Philosophy of Art* evokes, the absence of "detail" as a speculative concept is a distinctive trait of H.s work. H.'s use of it is not very frequent, and seems rather cursory, although he uses it at least in one case as the substantive of the verb "detaillieren," namely, "Detaillierung".

Gidwani, Vinay: Capitalism's Anxious Whole: Fear, Capture and Escape in the "Grundrisse." — In: Antipode. A Radical Journal of Geographie. Malden, MA. 40 (2008), 5, 857–878.

Two H.s inhabit the *Grundrisse*. The first is conservative of the "selfsame" subject that continuously returns to itself as non-identical identity and propels "history." The other H. carries with the "negative" he (which calls "non-being," "otherness," "difference") to disrupt this plenary subject to Marx's reading of a H. who is different-in-himself lends *Grundrisse* its electric buzz: seizing H.s "negative" as the not-value of value, i.e. "labor," Marx explains how capital must continuously enroll labor to its will in order to survive and expand. But this enrollment is never given; hence, despite its emergent structure of necessity, capital's return to itself as "self-animating value" is never free of peril. The most speculative aspect of my argument is that the figure of "labor" in *Grundrisse*, because of its radically open formulation as not-value, anticipates the elusive subject of difference in postcolonial theory, "the subaltern" – that figure which evades dialectical integration, and is in some ontological way inscrutable to the "master." Unexpectedly, then *Grundrisse* gives us a way to think beyond the epistemic and geographic power of "Europe."

Good, James: Dewey's "Permanent Hegelian Deposit:" A Reply to Hickman and Alexander. — In: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Bloomington. 44 (2008), 4, 577–602.

The article presents a response by the author to the comments on his book *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The Permanent Hegelian Deposit in the Philosophy of John Dewey*. The author notes on philosopher John Dewey's debt to author H. arguing that the former furthered the development of H.ian philosophy along humanistic and historicist lines. He examines Dewey's World War I criticisms of H. through his book *German Philosophy and Politics* which touched on idealism broadly and focus on characterizing pragmatism. Moreover, he argues against the notion that he understated the influence of philosopher William James' *Principles of Psychology* on Dewey.

Hernández, Héctor: Jaramillo canta en hegeliano. [Jaramillo singt Hegelianisch.] — In: Praxis. Revista del Departamento de Filosofía. Heredia, CR. 61 (2008), 135–147.

Hickman, Larry A.: Dewey's Hegel: A Search for Unity in Diversity, or Diversity as the Growth of Unity? — In: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Bloomington. 44 (2008), 4, 569–576.

The article presents an analysis of James Good's arguments in his book *A Search for Unity in Diversity: The Permanent Hegelian Deposit in the Philosophy of John Dewey*. The author focuses on Good's argument that the young Dewey views H. as a functionalist, historicist, instrumentalist, and practicalist. He examines the lines of influence between Dewey and philosopher William James during the 1880s and 1890s which were formative years of both pragmatism and functionalism. Also, he highlights Dewey's relationship to philosopher H.'s thought after his criticism of German philosophy around 1915.

Junyk, Ihor: Beyond the Dialectic: Conrad, Levinas, and the Scene of Recognition. — In: Modern Fiction Studies. Baltimore. 54 (2008), 1, 140–159.

A literary criticism of the book *Heart of Darkness* by Joseph Conrad is presented. It suggests that the reader is opened to a decisive move beyond scholar H.'s Master-Slave dialectic by approaching the book through Emmanuel Levinas. It states that when two subjects face each other at the scene of recognition, the likely outcome is the victory of one and the annihilation of the other.

Livieri, Paolo: L'oggetto di esperienza come processo di totalizzazione. Considerazioni sull'essenza spirituale nel „sapere assoluto“. [Das Objekt der Erfahrung als Prozeß der Totalisierung. Überlegungen zum geistigen Wesen im „absoluten Wissen“.] — In: verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 105–119.

The article examines the meaning of spiritual essence within absolute knowing. The analysis presented will shed light on the logical and phenomenological difference between the object of experience and the object of consciousness. The form of spiritual essence is introduced through a syllogistic structure and seems to determinate the scientific character of absolute knowing. H.'s conception of syllogism in the *Phenomenology* is not the one of his mature works, but proves to be

more articulate than the syllogism as it was conceived in the Jena period. The syllogistic structure of spiritual essence discloses the logical dimension beneath the phenomenological path.

Lynch, Richard: *The Alienating Mirror: Toward a Hegelian Critique of Lacan on Ego-Formation.* — In: *Human Studies. A Journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences.* Dordrecht. 31 (2008), 2, 209–221.

This article brings out certain philosophical difficulties in Lacan's account of the mirror stage, the initial moment of the subject's development. For Lacan, the "original organization of the forms of the ego" is "precipitated" in an infant's self-recognition in a mirror image; this event is explicitly prior to any social interactions. A H.ian objection to the Lacanian account argues that social interaction and recognition of others by infants are necessary prerequisites for infants' capacity to recognize them in a mirror image. Thus mutual recognition with another, rather than self-recognition in a mirror, is what makes possible subsequent ego-formation and self-consciousness. This intersubjective critique suggests that many of the psychoanalytic consequences that Lacan derives from the mirror stage (e.g., alienation, narcissism, and aggressively) may need to be rethought.

Maclaren, Kym: *Embodied Perceptions of Others as a Condition of Selfhood? Empirical and Phenomenological Considerations.* — In: *Journal of Consciousness Studies.* Toronto, CA-ON. 15 (2008), 8, 63–93.

Against recent claims that infants begin with a sense of themselves as distinct selves, I propose that the infant's initial sense of self is still indeterminate and ambiguous, and is only progressively consolidated, beginning with embodied perceptions of others. Drawing upon Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and H.'s notion of mutual recognition, and with reference to empirical studies in developmental psychology, I argue that perceiving other persons is significantly different from perceiving inanimate things. Until sufficient motor capacities have developed for exploring and perceptually disambiguating inanimate things, it is only in perceiving others who recognize her that the infant is able to realize herself as a self. As the physiological and behavioral evidence suggests, whereas inanimate things initially captivate and dispossess the young infant, other people return her to herself. This paper lends support to the ideas that humans are ontologically social beings, and that selfhood is socially conditioned rather than given with consciousness.

Mann, Geoff: *A Negative Geography of Necessity.* — In: *Antipode.* Malden. 40 (2008), 5, 921–934.

One of the many unfortunate results of the long-lived misconception that Marx was a "determinist" is a lack of engagement with his ideas of necessity and negation. Reading the *Grundrisse's* famous comments on the annihilation of space by time, I trace the H.ian roots of these concepts to show that for both Marx and H., negation is the very act of critique itself, and necessity is properly understood not as the force of history, but as the object of historical explanation – what makes things the way they are and not another. It is therefore crucial to critical geography's efforts to identify the possibilities for social change, for that analysis must be predicated on an understanding for how things have emerged in their present form, i.e. the one we have to work with. I argue that a negative geography of necessity is the essential basis for anything we might call a communist geography, a geography of "the real movement which abolishes the present state of things."

Másmela, Carlos: La individualidad de Don Quijote vista por Hegel. [Die Individualität Don Quixotes nach Hegel.] — In: *Eidos: Revista de Filosofía*. Barranquilla, CO. 8 (2008), 66–81.

The purpose of this essay is, based on elements given by the Aesthetics, to study the ironic construction of individuality in the internalizing of myth, as it happens in Don Quixote. In order to do this, the author will take support on two texts of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* where correspondences will be shown between H.'s writings and different passages from *Don Quixote*.

de la Maza Samhaber, Luis Mariano: Hegel y Schleiermacher: encuentros y desencuentros entre dialéctica especulativa y hermenéutica. [Hegel und Schleiermacher: Begegnungen und Entfremdungen zwischen spekulativer Dialektik und Hermeneutik.] — In: *Veritas. Revista de filosofía y teología*. Lo Vásquez, Casablanca, RCH. 19 (2008), 273–291.

The proposal of this article is to show that, instead of their rivalry and philosophical differences, H. and Schleiermacher have important points of contact, especially around the concepts of self-consciousness and dialectics, and makes possible their common influence in *Truth and Method* of Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Mendola, Gianluca: Sapere assoluto e finitezza. Alcune considerazioni a partire dal momento ‚conclusivo‘ della ‚Fenomenologia dello spirito‘ di Hegel. [Absolutes Wissen und Endlichkeit. Einige Überlegungen zum Moment des ‚Schlusses‘ von Hegels ‚Phänomenologie des Geistes‘.] — In: *verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.]* Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 63–82.

The article has two main aims: 1) the discussion of some contemporary interpretations of the last chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and, more generally, of the whole H.'ian system, as an expression of a metaphysics of the absolute; 2) the analysis of the relationship between absolute knowing and finitude (considered primarily as a manifestation of the historical dimension of knowledge). With respect to the first point, the article discusses two theses about absolute knowing: the first considers H.'s absolute as a 'metaphysical object,' the second highlights the untenability of the H.'ian claim that philosophy is the absolute knowledge of the absolute. Against the first argument, it is shown that it is not possible to conceive of absolute knowing as an object, highlighting the negative and subjective nature of absolute knowing. Against the second one, the peculiar form of absoluteness of absolute knowing is analyzed, emphasizing the negative function and the historical character of the process of manifestation of spirit. With respect to the second point, the article considers the relationship between absolute knowing and the finite dimension of consciousness, arguing that absolute knowing is a form of knowledge of consciousness and that it is realized by the historical and finite process of the development of humanity.

Morfinò, Vittorio: Causa Sui or Wechselwirkung: Engels between Spinoza and Hegel. — In: *Historical Materialism*. Leiden. 16 (2008), 1, 9–35.

The essay takes its point of departure from Jacques Monod's reading of dialectical materialism in *Chance and Necessity* (1971). A passage of Engels's *Dialectics of Nature*, which identifies Spinoza's concept of Causa Sui with the H.'ian concept of interaction (*„Wechselwirkung“*), provides the

opportunity to examine the consequences of Monod's claims more closely. Using Spinoza's philosophy as a litmus test, the essay attempts to demonstrate the debt of Engels's materialism to H.'s *Science of Logic* by tracing the development of the concept of "Wechselwirkung" in classical German philosophy. A profound difference between Spinoza's and H.'s concepts becomes apparent: while the concept of "Wechselwirkung" implies a totality present to itself as simultaneity, permitting the flow of a linear, homogenous and empty time upon which stages of development can be inscribed, the concept of *causa sui* implies a totality without closure, a totality whose eternity is identified with the necessary and infinite network of modal durations. The essay concludes by suggesting that Spinoza's concept of *Causa Sui* allows us to rethink the relation between freedom and necessity in the Marxist tradition in conjunctural and aleatory terms.

Nikolchina, Miglena: Between Irony and Revolution: Sexual Difference and the Case of "Aufhebung." — In: *Parallax*. London. 14 (2008), 2, 53–67.

The article offers information on the significance and importance of the German word *Aufhebung*, speculated by H. and its relation to sexual differences. *Aufhebung* is stated to signify annulment, destruction and cancellation on one hand and preservation and conservation on the other. H. is stated to consider the word as a speculative concept with excellence, whose untranslatable privilege is wielded by the German language.

De Nys, Martin J.: Dimensions of Absolute Knowing. — In: *Review of Metaphysics*. Washington. 61 (2008), 3, 555–576.

The article focuses on absolute knowing, the final topic that H. considers in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The three ways in which H. characterizes absolute knowing are discussed. H. says that absolute knowing involves a reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness, that it exhibits a coincidence of certainty with truth, and that it entails a transformation of substance into subject. In discussing these characterizations of absolute knowing the author examines both the final chapter of the *Phenomenology* and some key portions of the larger work.

Pérez Cortés, Sergio: El pensamiento libre y la razón en la Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel. [Das freie Denken und die Vernunft in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] — In: *Revista de Filosofía*. Ibero, Ciudad de México. 40 (2008), 121, 125–152.

The 200th Anniversary of the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* has allowed us to reconsider the true aims of the project of H.'s absolute idealism, which was undertaken within the book. In this light, this text will try to show that H.'s program fits squarely and in perfect continuity with Kant's philosophical critique, and pushes it to its utmost consequences. Indeed, for H., reason is free since it is the unity of reflection about external objects (the infamous thing-in-itself) and critical reflection of thought upon itself. Reason (or concept) is free, not because acting independent from external things, but rather because it includes absolute determination regarding those objects, and a full understanding of the thought that makes such determination possible. Such unity of thought and being is called 'absolute,' but as it has given up any claims on the superiority of thought over being, it is still a form of idealism.

de Pretto, Davide: Sapere assoluto e sapere abbandonato. La trattazione della Bildung del quarto capoverso de „il sapere assoluto“. [Absolutes Wissen und selbstentfremdetes Wissen. Die Diskussion über Bildung im vierten Absatz des Kapitels „absolutes Wissen“.]

— In: *verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.]* Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 121–138.

The article analyzes section VI B (“The Spirit in Self-Estrangement”) within absolute knowing. The main focus is H.’s speculative analysis of the formal structure of absolute knowing, starting from infinite judgement (“the thing is ego”), to its conclusion with the definition of utility as *preisgebendes Sein für anderes* (a being at the mercy of an “other,” in Baillie’s translation). The article does not examine the phenomenological process of culture development, but focuses on the formal structure of pure insight (the most important result of culture), comparing the self which constitutes the insight with the one which manifests itself as self-knowing spirit in absolute knowing. Here the inexorable *Aufhebung* of insight, as purest incarnation of modern reason, comes to light: H. emphasizes rationality and therefore he criticizes its abstract form which downgrades pure insight from reason to reasonnements of Understanding.

Rendón, Carlos E.: *El devenir de Hegel hacia la Fenomenología del Espíritu. [Das Werden Hegels zur Phänomenologie des Geistes.]* — In: *Ideas y valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofía.* Bogotá, CO. 137 (2008), 41–61.

This paper seeks to reconstruct the possible steps followed by H. toward his *Phenomenology of Mind*. Taking into account the historical variants of the process, this paper will try to determine the meaning and the relationship between these variants and the philosophical consolidation of the book. The development of the text does not follow a linear evolution, but rather shows unexpected but comprehensible continuities and ruptures. These contingencies will be decisive for some of the main formulations of the book itself, showing it as a “result” in the more H.’ian sense of the word: as that which is intrinsically linked to its becoming.

Ricci, Valentina: *La scienza come figura del concetto. [Die Wissenschaft als Figur des Begriffs.]* — In: *verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.]* Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 169–199.

The aim of this article is to present an interpretation of the nature and role of absolute knowing, which rests upon the concepts of *Form and Gestalt* (“*shape*”). These concepts constitute the essential dimensions of absolute knowing in virtue of which it is possible to give an account of its structure and central properties. The first dimension – “first” thanks to the ontological value it can be ascribed to – is “*Form*” which expresses the conceptual structure of absolute knowing; the second one, “*Gestalt*,” is the exemplification of that structure in the sphere of existence. By examining selected passages from the absolute knowing chapter it can be shown how H. uses these terms to refer respectively to the logical-conceptual structure of absolute knowing and to its concrete exteriorization, emphasizing from time to time one of the two sides. Hence it is shown that absolute knowing is fully achieved only insofar as consciousness attributes to its content both the “*Form*” and the “*Gestalt*” of the self or, in other words, insofar as it acknowledges that the properties of content are the same as its own, and conversely realizes that the properties of thought do reflect the structure of its content. The article concludes with the examination of some questions about the subject of absolute knowing in order to highlight the pivotal role played by the temporal-historical dimension.

Rocco Lozano, Valerio: La noción de cartografía en Hegel. [Der Begriff der Kartographie bei Hegel.] — In: Despalabro. Ensayos de humanidades. Madrid. 2 (2008), 39–54.

Ruddick, Sue: Towards a dialectics of the positive. — In: environment and planning. London. 40 (2008), 11, 2588–2602.

The persistent divide within French philosophy between so-called structuralists and poststructuralists has been recently revived in the writings of Badiou and others. This narration of the history of French philosophy is trapped inevitably in the very way it poses the problem: as dialectic of the negative. The abstracting of these traditions from all their messiness into a dialectical opposition is itself part of the problem, a misrepresentation, ignoring any points of convergence. Drawing centrally on the work of Pierre Macherey, I suggest this divide can be traced back to H.'s profound misreading of Spinoza, which became the basis for H.'s dialectic and Marx's subsequent inversion. I explore crucial points of convergence between Marx and Spinoza, and a resonance between Deleuze and Macherey (who are often stereotyped as emblems of oppositional tendencies within French philosophy). Their work converges on a rejection of negation as the defining quality of essence or multiplicity and, in the case of Deleuze and Macherey, a shared uptake of Spinoza's concept of *potentia*. Their work gestures towards the development of a dialectics of the positive: a problematic that might enable us to think across our differences to a political ontology that embraces the post human, immanent, and affirmative qualities of struggle.

Samonà, Leonardo: Autocoscienza e sapere assoluto. [Selbstbewußtsein und absolutes Wissen.] — In: verifche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 33–61.

The article individuates free self-alienation and reconciliation as the specific characters of the last chapter of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in contrast to an interpretation of absolute knowing as appropriation of otherness within self-consciousness. Such self-alienation has already been developed by H. in the chapter "*Religion*." The limit of religion depends on the last opposition to otherness, and not on the presence of otherness itself, which has already been taken off along the path of self-becoming and self-consciousness. The overcoming of this opposition represents the crucial difference between self-consciousness in chapter IV and self-consciousness of spirit. The inclusion of otherness is realized in the content of revealed religion, but not in its form, which is imprisoned in the reference to an abstract divinity. The aim of absolute knowing is to change the sense of absoluteness, which has to mean the overcoming of "*Entfremdung*" through "*Entäusserung*" and "*Versöhnung*," or through the unification of self-consciousness with consciousness: absolute spirit becomes another form itself and includes the other in its own identity.

Sánchez de León Serrano, José María: Signo y sujeto lógico en Hegel. [Zeichen und logisches Subjekt bei Hegel.] — In: Estudios de Filosofía, Medellín, CO. 37 (2008), 141–158.

The paper examines the essential connection between the H.ian concept of sign and the functioning of speculative discourse in the *Science of Logic*. Starting from the unresolved tension in Kantian philosophy between the significant capacity of discourse and its auto-referentiality, there will be a focus on the H.ian intent to resolve this tension in his treatment of language, which is to be found

in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*. We will thus uncover the subtle way in which the H.ian conception of sign enables the overcoming of the restrictions that Kant imposes on philosophical discourse without defying the basic prescription of Critical Philosophy, according to which all thinking has to be associated with an intuition in order to constitute a knowledge which pretends to be valid. Based on that result and concentrating on the very structure of the sign as H. conceptualizes it, we will then try to shed some light on the exact functioning of logical discourse and its basic moments – understanding, dialectics and speculation – by means of the specific example of the first three determinations of Logic: Being, Nothing and Becoming.

Sandemose, Jørgen: Modern Eleusis: Religion and Factory. — In: *Science & Society*. New York. 72 (2008), 3, 266–294.

Marx's reflections on Christianity depend on H.'s *Phenomenology of Mind*, and this was the context in which he conceived the idea of treating the critique of religion as a starting-point for the critique of bourgeois society in general. There are three different political-economic connections in which Marx employs the concept of religion to shed light on capitalist society in general: the relation between bourgeois and citizen in capitalist society; the phenomena of commodity circulation; and, finally, the production process. The close relation between Christianity and the alienating nature of capitalist production may well explain why Marx did not follow up his critique of religion in the form of a specific work – a question recently brought forward by Alexander Saxton. Analysis of some general features of the relation between capital and religion leads to the conclusion that Protestantism prevails as the true religious form in capitalist society. The capitalism-religion connection sheds light on the Marxian concept of workers' subsumption under capital at the global level.

Tang, Kuo-yang: From philosophy of history to political philosophy: an ideological investigation of globalization. — In: *International Review of Sociology*. London. 18 (2008), 2, 197–209.

Many have argued that one of the reasons for the irresistible trend of liberal democracy is the irreversible process of globalization. The logic assumes that globalization is not only an inseparable prerequisite for promoting economic development but also the dynamic to transform political structures into liberalism in less democratic countries, because economic development within countries creates new middle classes around the world, with their natural demands for more participation in decision and political pluralism. In other words, all societies will evolve to a point where they will adopt liberal democratic institutions. In turn, the resulting new world order will be characterized by international cooperation through market economies and liberal democracy. This paper investigates the ideological origin of globalization by inspecting Fukuyama's theory of the 'end of history.' It argues that this belief is a continuance of modernization theory and reminiscent of functionalist concepts by Western scholars concerning the development of less developed countries. The difference is that globalizers cleverly cover their ethnocentrism with H.'s philosophy, as it implies that the Western system is some perfect theory that all people will eventually accept as their cultures and societies evolve into a Western superior state.

Vernon, Jim: *American Antigone: Hegelian Reflections on the Sheehan–Bush Conflict*. — In: *Telos: Quarterly Journal of Politics, Philosophy, Critical Theory, Culture, and the Arts*. New York, NY. 144 (2008), 180–192.

The article offers a look at the emergence of the Iraq war and the arguments against such war. It uses the H.ian philosophy to analyze the conflict between anti-war leader Cindy Sheehan and U.S. President George W. Bush in relation to the war. It aims to illustrate the poverty of an anti-war movement using the claims of Sheehan on the Iraq war. The author claims that the conflict between Sheehan and Bush depicts a social form which was analyzed by H. in the 18th century. He argues that to avoid wars, people must continuously conduct self-criticism, confession and change of custom.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *Problèmes de christologie chez Hegel (1801–1807)*. — In: Eric Gaziaux (Éd.): *Philosophie et théologie*. Festschrift Emilio Brito. Leuven 2008. 125–147.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *La nécessité d'une instance internationale et les limites de l'État moderne. L'actualité du débat entre Kant et Hegel, cosmopolitisme et antic cosmopolitisme*. — In: Yves-Charles Zarka/Caroline Guibet-Lafaye (Éd.): *Kant cosmopolitique*. Paris 2008. 137–156.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *La cristologia filosofica hegeliana in prospettiva fenomenologica*. — In: *Filosofia e Teologia*. Paris. 3 (2007) (paru en février 2008), 596–612.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *Hegel: Anthropomorphisme et christologie*. — In: Miklas Vetö/ Philippe Soual (Éd.): *L'idéalisme allemand et la religion*. Paris 2008. 91–101.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *Le même et l'autre: du „Sophiste“ de Platon à la „Logique“ de Hegel*. — In: *Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg*. Platon et Aristote à la lumière de la philosophie allemande, penser, être, agir. Strasbourg. 23 (2008), 37–51.

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *État divin, État laïque, ou la place de la religion dans la philosophie de Hegel*. — In: Bernard Bourgeois (Éd.): *Hegel, Bicentenaire de la „Phénoménologie de l'esprit“*. Paris 2008. 111–125. (Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie)

Vieillard-Baron, Jean-Louis: *La Trinité hégélienne: la critique de Kant comme source pour la théologie trinitaire*. — In: Emmanuel Durand/Vincent Holzer (Éd.): *Les sources du renouveau de la théologie trinitaire au XXème siècle*. Paris 2008. 187–200.

Vinci, Paolo: Sapere, assoluto e riconoscimento: dalla comunità allo spirito agente. [Wis- sen, Absolutes und Anerkennung: von der Gemeinschaft zum handelnden Geist.] — In: verifiche. Che cos'è il sapere assoluto? Sul capitolo conclusivo della Fenomenologia dello Spirito di Hegel. [Was ist das absolute Wissen? Zum abschließenden Kapitel von Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes.] Trento. XXXIX (2008), 1–3, 11–32.

The article analyzes the relationship between absolute knowing and the process of recognition in self-consciousness. The theme is discussed in relation to H.s thesis of the scientific character of philosophical knowledge. The article shows how the dialectical relationship between judging consciousness and the consciousness that acts is essential to understand the status of absolute knowing. To support this thesis, the article examines H.s discussion on the forms of manifestation of spirit within the chapter “Spirit” and the H.ian analysis of the relationship between revealed religion and absolute knowing. Self-consciousness embodies the concept of spirit because it is constituted by the movement of infinity and is therefore a self-differentiating whole. The structure of self-consciousness characterizes the specificity of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: the convergence of a form of knowledge and a form of human subjectivity. Another central theme is action, in which the ‘horizontal’ recognition of the self-consciousnesses gives rise to the ‘vertical recognition’ of spirit. The action itself is the bearer of the unity of essence and Dasein, universality and particularity, substantiality and singular subjectivity.

Westerkamp, Dirk: The Philonic Distinction: German Enlightenment Historiography of Jewish Thought. — In: History and Theory. Middletown, CT. 47 (2008), 4, 533–559.

Leon Roth’s famous question “Is there a Jewish philosophy?” has been the subject of an ongoing controversial debate. This paper argues that the concept of a Jewish philosophy – in the sense of an allegedly continuous philosophical tradition stretching from antiquity to early modernity – was created by German Enlightenment historians of philosophy. Under competing models of historiography, Enlightenment philosophy construed a continuous tradition of Jewish thought, a *philosophia hebraeorum perennis*, establishing a controversially discussed order of discourse and a specific politics of historiography. Within this historiography, historical and systematical paradigms, values, and patterns kept shifting continuously; opening up perspectives for different, even contradictory accounts of what Jewish philosophy was (and is). With H. and his successors, this specific discourse came to a close. H. attacks “Jewish thought” as a form of metaphysics of substance – a critique countered by several thinkers who can be referred to as “Jewish Hegelians” (E. Fackenheim). The Jewish H.ians fully accepted, however, H.s account of the “Philonic distinction:” the difference between substance and subject within the conception of the one. This calls attention to the idea that not only the role of the “mosaic distinction” (J. Assmann), the distinction between true and false in religion, should be examined more closely, but also the consequences of the “Philonic distinction” between identity and difference in monotheistic concepts of deity.

Ye, Xiushan/Zhang, Lin: Levinas Faces Kant, Hegel and Heidegger: Debates of Contemporary Philosophy on Ontology. — In: Frontiers of Philosophy in China. Beijing. 3 (2008), 3, 438–454.

Levinas subverts the traditional “ontology-epistemology” and creates a “realm of difference,” the realm of “value,” “ethic,” and “religion,” maintaining that ethics is real metaphysics. According to him, it is not that “being” contains the “other” but the other way round. In this way, the issues of ethics are promoted greatly in the realm of philosophy. Nonetheless, he does not intend to deny “ontology” completely, but reversed the relationship between “ontology (theory of truth)” and

“ethics (axiology),” placing the former under the “constraint” of the latter. Different from general empirical science, philosophy focuses more on issues irrelevant to ordinary empirical objects; it does have “objects,” though, more often than not, the issues of philosophy cannot be conceptualized into “propositions;” nevertheless, it absolutely has its “theme.” As a discipline, philosophy continuously takes “being” as its “theme” and “object” of thinking. The point is that this “being” should not be understood as an “object” completely. Rather, it is still a “theme-subject.” In addition to an “object,” “being” also manifests itself in an “attribute” and a kind of “meaning” as well. In a word, it is the temporal, historical, and free “being” rather than “various beings” that is the “theme-subject” of philosophy.