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His research interests lie in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. A special focus of his current research is the problem of first person authority: How is authoritative knowledge of one's own mind possible? Why do we not seem to rely on evidence in this type of knowledge? Why is it less prone to error than knowledge of other people's minds? In a couple of recent publications he has examined different approaches to this problem and defended an Evans-inspired account of the access we have to our own minds.

His publications include "Solidity and Impediment" (with Paul Snowdon), *Analysis* 63 (2003); "Kant's Four Notions of Freedom", *Hekmat Va Falsafeh* 1 (2005); "Davidson y la autoridad de la primera persona", *Diánoia* 52 (2007); "Henrich on Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories", in Valerio Rohden et al. (eds.): *Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants*, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008; "Teorías constitutivas de la autoridad de la primera persona: Wright y Heal", *Ludus Vitalis* 16 (2008); "Evans and First Person Authority", *Abstracta* 5 (2009); "Autoconciencia e identidad personal", *Península* 5 (2010); "¿Es real el espacio? Perspectivas modernas: Newton, Leibniz y Kant", in Rosario Gómez et al. (eds.): *Diálogos sobre los espacios*, Mérida: UNAM, (forthcoming); and "Racionalidad y autoconocimiento en Shoemaker", in Pedro Stepanenko (ed.): *La primera persona y sus percepciones*, Mérida: UNAM (forthcoming).