Andrea Robitzsch

"It is a curiosity of the philosophical temperament, this passion for radical solutions.
Do you feel a little twinge in your epistemology? Absolute scepticism is the thing to try...Apparently the rule is this:
if aspirin doesn't work try cutting off your head."

(Jerry Fodor (1985) in Vincent Hendricks (2006): Mainstream and Formal Epistemology. (p. 1).)

 Consultation Hour (Room GA 3/37):

• materials for my seminar "Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie" [Introduction to Epistemology] are available at blackboard
• Some useful links

Interests of Scientific Research

• Epistemology, normative epistemology, epistemic deontologism, theories of epistemic justification, social epistemology
• Philosophical Logic, especially modal epistemic logic
• Philosophy of Language

Qualification

• Since october 2010 I am working on my PhD-Thesis, which consists in the delevopement of an externalist notion of epistemic responsibility and an investigation of its application to phenomena in the domain of social epistemology. The proposed notion of epistemic responsibility depends on the appropriate exercise of doxastic control.
  
  Working title: An Externalist Approach to Epistemic Responsibility -- Epistemic Duties and their Place in Social Epistemology
   
• July 2010 M.A. (Magistra Artium) in Philosophy (Dresden University of Technology; first advisor: Prof. Dr. Heinrich Wansing)

Master's Thesis (2010)

Kruse, A. (2010): Epistemische Deontologie. Eine Analyse der Realisierbarkeit und Anwendung doxastischer Kontrolle und epistemischer Pflichten. (engl.: Epistemic Deontologism. An Analysis of the Realizability and Applicability of Doxastic Control and Epistemic Duties.). Unpublished Master's Thesis. Dresden University of Technology.

Publications

• Kruse, A. (2015): Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control. Synthese, 1-32 (online first).
• Kruse, A. (2015): Nikolaj Nottelmann – Blameworthy belief. A study in epistemic deontologism. Erkenntnis, 80, 675-680.
• Kruse, A. (2013): What are Epistemic Duties?. In: Hoeltje, M., Spitzley, T. & Spohn, W. (eds.): What may we believe? What ought we to do? Proceedings of GAP.8, the Eighth International Conference of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, pp. 340-351. 
• Kruse, A. (2011): Puzzles about Peer Disagreement. A Deontological Solution. In: Jäger, C. & Löffler, W. (Hrsg.), Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement. Papers of the 34 th  International Wittgenstein Symposium. Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, pp. 157-159.

Talks

• How to be an epistemic consequentialist? (Or how we learned not to be a mad mad dog reliabilist), GAP.9, Universität Osnabrück, September 2015.
• How can believed defeaters be neutralized? Workshop: Defeaters, Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat, Universität zu Köln, Juni 2015.
• Die epistemische Bedeutung von Peer Dissens. Workshop: Epistemischer Relativismus und Peer Dissens, Technische Universität Dresden, Mai 2015.
• Worauf basiert epistemische Verantwortlichkeit? Mittelbaukolloquium des Instituts für Philosophie, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Juli 2014.
• What is epistemic responsibility based on? Workshop: Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Juni 2014.
• An externalist approach to epistemic blameworthiness. Workshop: Responsibility -- The Epistemic Dimension, VU University Amsterdam, April 2014.
• Epistemic Internalism without ACCESS?, Comment on Duncan Pritchard at the 8th Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Cologne, September 2013.
• Combining Epistemic Blameworthiness with Compatibilist Doxastic Control.?,Comment on Matthias Steup at the workshop Doxastic Freedom and Normativity, Regensburg, September 2013.
• The Diachronic Dimension of Peer Disagreement?, Congress on Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent, September 2013.
• Was sind epistemische Pflichten? [What are Epistemic Duties? ], GAP.8, Konstanz, September 2012.
• Notes on rational 'ought' implies 'can', Cologne Summer School in Philosophy, Köln, Juli 2012.
• Der Begriff der epistemischen Verantwortung und die Möglichkeit rationalen Dissenses, Philosophisches Kolloquium des Instituts für Philosophie der Technischen Universität Dresden, Juni 2012.
• Is Rational Peer Disagreement Possible? Research Colloquium: Philosophy meets Cognitive Science. Recent Debates, Ruhr Universität Bochum, Bochum, Januar 2012.
• Puzzles about Peer Disagreement. A Deontological Solution. 34. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, August 2011.