Dewhurst, J. & Dołęga, K. (2020). Attending to the Illusion of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27(5-6): 54-61.
Dołęga, K., Dewhurst, J. (2015) Curtain call at the cartesian theatre. Journal of consciousness studies 22 (9/10), 109-128.
Dołęga, K. (2018) Commentary: M-autonomy. Frontiers in Psychology 9:680.
Kammerer, F., Frankish, K. (2023) What forms could introspective systems take? Journal of Consciousness Studies 30(9-10), 13-48.
Kammerer, F. (2023) Certainty and our sense of acquaintance with experiences. Erkenntnis 88(7), 3015-3036.
Kammerer, F. (2022a) How can you be so sure? Philosophical Studies 179(9), 2845-2867.
Kammerer, F. (2022b) Ethics without sentience. Facing up to the probable insignificance of phenomenal consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 29(3-4), 180-204.
Roelofs, L. (2018) The compatibility of the structure-and-dynamics argument and phenomenal functionalism about space. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99(S1), 44-52.
Roelofs, L., Buchanan, J., (2019) Panpsychism, intuitions, and the great chain of being. Philosophical Studies 176(11), 2991-3017.
Schlicht, T. (2018c) A methodological dilemma for investigating consciousness empirically. Consciousness and Cognition 66, 91-100.
Schlicht, T. (2018e) Kognition und Bewusstsein. In: Das Wunder des Verstehens, ed. by K. Liggieri, H.-U. Lessing. Freiburg: Alber.
Schlicht, T. (2017) Experiencing organisms. From Mineness to subject of experience. Philosophical Studies 175(10), 2447-2474.
Schlicht, T. (2016b) Selves, or something near enough. In: Life, Body, Person and Self. Ed. by E. Guhe, S. Graetzel. Freiburg: Alber.
Schlicht, T. (2016c) Explaining subjective character. Representation, Reflexivity or Integration? Commentary on Kenneth Williford, in: OpenMind, ed. by T. Metzinger, J. Windt. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Vernazzani, A. (2016) Psychoneural Isomorphism and Content-NCCs. Gestalt-Theory 38 (2/3), 177-190.
Smortchkova, J., Dołęga, K., Schlicht, T. (Eds.) (2020) What are mental Representations? New York: Oxford University Press.
Schlicht, T., Smortchkova, J. (Eds.) (2018) Mentale Repräsentationen. Grundlagentexte. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
Vernazzani, A., Skrzypulec, B., Schlicht, T. (Eds.) (2020) The structure of perceptual objects (Special Issue of) Synthese.
Dołęga, K., Schlicht, T. (2022) Mental content. In: Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A philosophical introduction. Ed. by B. Young, C. Dicey Jennings. London: Routledge.
Murez, M., Smortchkova, J. (2015) Singular thought: Object-files, person-files, and the sortal PERSON. Topics in cognitive science 6, 632-646.
Starzak, T., Gray, R. (2021) Towards ending the animal cognition war: a three-dimensional model of causal cognition. Biology & Philosophy 36(2), 1-24.
Martens, J. (2020) Doing things together: A theory of skillful joint action. Berlin: DeGruyter.
Schlicht, T. (2023) Philosophy of Social Cognition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Schlicht, T. (2018a) Soziale Kognition zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius.
Venter, E. (2020) Perceiving agents: Self and Other. Doctoral Dissertation, Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Catalog University Library Bochum.
Dołęga, K., Schlicht, T., Dennett, D.C. (2020) Explaining or redefining mindreading? Comment on Target Paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43, p.35, E101.
Martens, J. (2018) Exploring the relation between the sense of the other and the sense of us: Core agency cognition, emergent coordination, and the sense of agency. Journal of Social Philosophy 49(1), 38-60.
Martens, J., Schlicht, T. (2017) Individualism vs. Interactionism about social cognition. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 17(2), 245-266.
Roelofs, L. (2019) Seeing the invisible: How to perceive, imagine, and infer the minds of others. Erkenntnis 83(2), 205-229.
Roelofs, L., Martens, J. (2020) Implicit coordination: acting quasi-jointly on implicit shared intentions. Journal of Social Ontology 4(2), 93-120.
Schlicht, T., Brandl, J., Esken, F., Glock, H.-J., Newen, A., Perner, J., Poprawe, F., Schmidt, E., Strasser, A., Wolf, J. (2021) Teleology first: Goals before Knowledge and Belief. Comment on Target Paper in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. doi:10.1017/S0140525X20001533, e0.
Schlicht, T., Martens, J. (2017) Soziale Wahrnehmung. In: Bedeutung und Gefährdung der Sinne im digitalen Zeitalter. Wittener Kolloquium für Humanismus, Medizin und Philosophie Bd. 5. Hrsg. von J. Weinzierl, P. Heusser. Königshausen & Neumann.
Smortchkova, J. (2020) Seeing goal-directedness: a case for social perception. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3), 855-879.
Smortchkova, J. (2016a) Encapsulated social perception of emotional expressions. Consciousness and Cognition 47:38-47.
Smortchkova, J. (2016b) Seeing emotions without mindreading them. Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences 16 (3):525-543. DOI 10.1007/s11097-016-9473-z.
Starzak, T., Newen, A. (2022) How to ascribe beliefs to animals. Mind and Language 37(1), 3-21.
Harris, K.R. (forthcoming) Smoke Machines: Emotive Artificial Intelligence and Deceptive Signaling. American Philosophical Quarterly.
Harris, K.R. (2024) AI or Your Lying Eyes: Some Shortcomings of Automatic Deepfake Detectors. Philosophy & Technology 37(7), 1-19.
Harris, K.R. (2023) Liars and Trolls and Bots Online: The Problem of Fake Persons. Philosophy & Technology 36(2), 1-19.
Weber-Guskar, E., Schlicht, T. (2022) Soziale Kognition mit Systemen Künstlicher Intelligenz: Kognitionstheoretische Grundlagen und normative Fragen. In: Soziales Lernen, Beziehung und Mentalisieren. Hrsg. von H. Kirsch, A. Ramberg, T. Nolte, S. Gingelmaier. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Casper, M.-O. (2018) Social Enactivism: On situating high-level cognitive states and processes. Berlin: DeGruyter.
Harris, K.R. (2022) Why the Self Does Not Extend. Erkenntnis 87(6), 2645-2659.
Matyja, J.R., Dołęga, K. (2015) Radical Embodied Neuroscience - How and Why? A commentary on: The Embodied Brain: Towards a radical embodied cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience. 9: 669.
Roelofs, L. (2018) Why Imagining Requires Content: a Reply to a Reply to an Objection to Radical Enactive Cognition. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 1-9.
Schlicht, T., Starzak, T. (2019) Prospects of enactivist approaches to intentionality and cognition. Synthese doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02361-z.
Schlicht, T. (2018b) Does Separating Intentionality from Mental Representation imply Radical Enactivism? Frontiers in Psychology 9:1497, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01497.
Schlicht, T. (2018d) Critical note on Hohwy, Menary, Lamb and Chemero, and Froese. In: Oxford Handbook on 4E cognition. Ed. by A. Newen, S. Gallagher, L. de Bruin. Oxford University Press.
Starzak, T., Schlicht, T. (2023) Can affordances be reasons? Philosophical Psychology. doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2270694.
Dołęga, K. (2019) Content and consciousness in predictive processing. (Publication No. rub.3413910) Doctoral Dissertation, Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Catalog University Library Bochum.
Miller, M., Clark, A., Schlicht, T. (Eds.) (2021) Predictive Processing and Consciousness. Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Dołęga, K., Roelofs, L., Schlicht, T. (Eds.) (2018) Enactivism, Representationalism and Predictive Processing (Special Issue of) Philosophical Explorations 21(2).
Bruineberg, J., Dołęga, K., Dewhurst, J., & Baltieri, M. (2022). The Emperor’s New Markov Blankets. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, E183. doi:10.1017/S0140525X21002351.
Bruineberg, J., Dołęga, K., Dewhurst, J., & Baltieri, M. (2022). The Emperor Is Naked: Replies to commentaries on the target article. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, E219. doi:10.1017/ S0140525X22000656.
Dołęga, K. (2017). Moderate Predictive Processing. In T.K. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group, Frankfurt am Main. doi: 10.15502/9783958573147.
Dołęga, K. & Dewhurst, J. (2020) Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework. Synthese 198, 7781-7806.
Poth, N. (2022) Schema-Centred Unity and Process-Centred Pluralism of the Predictive Mind. Minds & Machines. doi.org/10.1007/s11023-022-09595-w.
Poth, Nina (2022) Refining the Bayesian approach to unifying generalisation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. doi.org/10.1007/s13164-022-00613-5.
Poth, N. (2023). Same but different: Providing a probabilistic foundation for the feature-matching approach to similarity and categorization. Erkenntnis, p. 1-25. doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00696-1.
Schlicht, T. (2025) Predictive Processing's Flirt with Transcendental Idealism. Noûs https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12552.
Schlicht, T., Dołęga, K. (2021) You can’t always get what you want: Predictive Processing and Consciousness. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Vol. 2, https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2021.80.
Schlicht, T., Venter, E. (2019) Getting the world right. Perceptual accuracy and the role of the perceiver in predictive processing models. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26(3/4), 181-206.
Venter, E. (2020) Toward an embodied, embedded predictive processing account. Frontiers in Psychology 12: 137. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.543076.
Harris, K.R. (2024) Misinformation, Content Moderation, and Social Epistemology. London: Routledge.
Harris, K.R. (2024) Social Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Exactingness. Episteme
Harris, K.R. (2024) Where Conspiracy Theories Come From, What They Do, and What To Do About Them. Inquiry.
Harris, K.R. (2024) Intellectual Virtue Signaling and (Non)Expert Credibility. Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
Harris, K.R. (2023) Ability, Knowledge, and Non-Paradigmatic Testimony. Episteme.
Harris, K.R. (2023) Beyond Belief: On Disinformation and Manipulation. Erkenntnis.
Harris, K.R. (2023) Conspiracy Theories, Populism, and Epistemic Autonomy. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9(1), 21-36.
Harris, K.R. (2023) Epistemic Domination. Thought 11(3), 134-141.
Harris, K.R. (2023) The Simulation Argument Reconsidered. Analysis.
Harris, K.R. (2022) Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem? American Philosophical Quarterly 59(2), 149-159.
Harris, K.R. (2022) Outward-facing Epistemic Vice. Synthese 200(6), 1-16.
Harris, K.R. (2022) Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation. Philosophy & Technology 35(3), 1-24.
Harris, K.R. (2022) Some Problems with Particularism. Synthese 200(6), 1-16.
Harris, K.R. (2021) Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm. Synthese 199(5-6), 13373-13391.
Poth, N. & Dolega, K. (2023) Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories. Philosophical Psychology (6), 1182-1207. dot:10.1080/09515089.2023.2168881.
Schlicht, T. (2022) Minds, Brains, and Deep Learning. The development of cognitive science through the lens of Kant’s approach to Cognition. In: Kant and Artificial Intelligence, ed. by H. Kim, D. Schönecker. Berlin: DeGruyter (Open Access)
Schlicht, T. (2016a) Kant and the problem of consciousness. In: Consciousness and the great Philosophers. Ed. by S. Leach & J. Tartaglia. London Routledge.
Schlicht, T., Newen, A. (2015) Kant and Cognitive Science revisited. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 18: 87-113.
Copyright © bewusstsein 2025
Last update: Sep 22, 2025